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by keeping the court within its appropriate role of deferring to Congress's
legislative supremacy. In practice, the avoidance canon is in tension with
legislative supremacy because it frequently results in questionable statutory
interpretations and because it places the burden on Congress to act explicitly
before a court will interpret a law as coming close to the constitutional line-
even though the enacting legislature might have intended to pass a constitu-
tionally questionable statute and even though such a statute might, in fact,
be constitutional. Moreover, the avoidance canon frequently does not avoid
the making of constitutional law, but instead shifts the nature and timing of
constitutional decisions. Professor Kelley argues, contrary to longstanding
assumptions, that the avoidance canon therefore does not place the courts in
a deferential mode in relation to Congress.
Professor Kelley then offers a new critique of the avoidance canon that
exposes its even deeper flaws. The avoidance canon most seriously intrudes
upon the powers and prerogatives of the Executive by imposing statutory con-
structions over the objection of the Executive, usually in the form of an
agency, which has offered an alternative reading in the course of determining
how to execute the laws, and which has concluded that its statutory reading
is constitutional. That judicial intrusion reflects not only a lack of inter-
branch comity, but also arrogates to the court the Article II power to execute
the laws. Professor Kelley concludes that the avoidance canon's failure to
serve its purported purpose calls for its abandonment.
INTRODUCTION
The rule of "constitutional doubt" holds that "where a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such ques-
tions are avoided, [a court's] duty is to adopt the latter."' That famil-
iar canon of statutory construction-which this Article will call the
"avoidance canon"-has been "repeatedly affirmed"2 to the point that
it has achieved rare status as a "cardinal principle" that "is beyond
debate."3 Indeed, some form of the avoidance canon has been a fun-
damental norm of constitutional litigation for almost two centuries, 4
and it continues today to be generally regarded as central to how
1 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999) (quoting United States ex ret. Attor-
ney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
2 Id.
3 EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
4 The first traces of the canon can be found in an 1804 opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
There the Court stated (without citing any authority) that "an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
Id. at 118. The earliest explicit invocation of the avoidance canon was by Chief Justice
Marshall riding circuit in Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No.
11,558). As I shall discuss, see infra note 58 and accompanying text, the avoidance canon's
modem form dates to the decision in Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 408.
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courts perform their function in constitutional litigation. Every term,
opinions for the Court invoke the canon time and again,5 and virtu-
ally never has any Justice voiced doubts about its legitimacy.
Until relatively recently, moreover, commentators seemed not to
focus much attention on the avoidance canon and whether it in fact
advances its purported purpose of serving the separation of powers.
And the academic commentary that was ventured offered only rela-
tively mild criticism.6 As Judge Friendly said, challenging the avoid-
ance canon traditionally has been "rather like challenging Holy
Writ."7 Recent years have witnessed, however, a significant kindling of
academic interest in the avoidance canon."
5 There have been nearly thirty cases in the last decade or so in which the Court
invoked the avoidance canon, or an individualJustice urged that the Court do so. SreReno
v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999); Pa. Dep't of Corr. v.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998); Fed. Election Comm'n %. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 32 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 356
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250
(1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 112
(1998) (Stevens, J., concurring); Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1997); Ed-
mond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 658 (1997); United States %. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S.
839, 875 (1996); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 182 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 441 (1995) (SouterJ., dis-
senting); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 216 n.2 (1995); United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Con-
str. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1993); Reno %. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 334 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 412
(1992) (White, J., concurring); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 170 (1992); Rob-
ertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992); Burns %. United States, 501 U.S.
129, 138 (1991); Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 126 (1991); Rust v. Sullian, 500 U.S.
173, 190-91 (1991), abrogation recognized b, Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 55
F. Supp. 2d 441 (E.D. Va. 1996); Webster v. Reprod. Health Serys., 492 U.S. 490, 514
(1989) (plurality opinion); Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440,455 (1989); Gomez v. United
States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 406 n.28 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 US. 654, 682 (1988);
see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 516 (1991) (relying on previous cases
that used the avoidance canon to construct the same statute at issue); Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 464 (1991) (rejecting petitioner's argument that the Court invoke the
canon); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989) (same).
6 See, eg., Harry H. Wellington, Machinists %. Street.- Statutory Intnpretation and the
Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, 1961 Sup. CT. RE%'. 49.
7 HENRYJ. FRiENDLY, ,fr. Justice Franhfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in BENaCnuus
196, 211 (1967).
8 Several recent articles have dealt primarily with the avoidance canon. &e Lisa A.
Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L REv. 1003 (1994) (hereinafter
Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions]; Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Con-
stitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns. 30
U.C. DAVIs L Rn. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Kloppenberg, Free Sperah Concerns]; Brian C. Mur-
chison, Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the Avoidance Canon in Separation of
Powers Cases, 30 GA. L REv. 85 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Reisited, 1995 SuP.
CT. Rv. 71. Looking farther back, Judge Friendly questioned the canon-with, in Judge
Posner's words, his "customary power," RicHARD A. Posr.nR, THE FDr.,,t. CoL'RTS: Crusts
AN Rrroim 284 (1985)-in a 1964 essay. FRiENDLY, supra note 7, at 211-12. Two decades
laterJudge Posner echoedJudge Friendly's views, pointing out the possibility that constru-
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Traditional thinking about the avoidance canon has considered
only the relationship between the Court and Congress; on that con-
ventional account, constitutional litigation is a two-branch problem
involving a confrontation between only Congress and the Judiciary.
This Article offers a new critique of the avoidance canon-one that
considers the role of the Executive, as well as that of Congress, in rela-
tion to the Court. The avoidance canon implicates the structural rela-
tionships among all three branches9 of the federal government. This
Article argues that the canon seriously intrudes upon the roles of both
Congress and the Executive in the constitutional scheme.
Indeed, it is the role of the Executive which the avoidance canon
most seriously threatens. As a general matter, litigation over the con-
stitutionality of a law enacted by Congress will most often entail the
presence of the Executive-either in the form of the Attorney Gen-
eral speaking on behalf of the President 10 or some administrative
agency answerable (at some level) to the President. When the Court
refuses to credit the Executive's reading of a statute in the name of
avoiding the resolution of a serious constitutional question, it threat-
ens to displace the President in his discharge of his constitutional duty
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.""
Not only does the avoidance canon threaten the role of the Exec-
utive, it also fails to serve the deferential ends that it sets for itself vis-a-
vis Congress. Rather than serving the norm of legislative supremacy-
a laudable goal in the abstract-statutory interpretations adopted in
order to avoid deciding serious constitutional questions often end up
bearing no resemblance to anything that the legislature foresaw or
intended. 12 Thus, the avoidance canon ironically results in the
Court's impinging on Congress's supreme role in the legislative
sphere, in the name of not doing so.
ing a statute to avoid deciding constitutional issues will result in a meaning never contem-
plated by the Congress that enacted the words at issue. POSNER, supra, at 284-85.
9 I use the colloquial term "branches" to refer to the three Departments of the fed-
eral government established by the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. arts. 1-111; cf Steven G.
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciar,
105 HARv. L. REv. 1153, 1156 n.6 (1992) ("The use of the word 'branch' is unfortunate.");
Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81
IOWA L. Rxv. 1267, 1270 n.6 (1996) (following the "dominant practice of the founding
generation by [using the term] 'departments'").
10 Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (1994) (requiring a court to notify the Attorney General if
the constitutionality of an Act of Congress becomes at issue in litigation involving private
parties, and giving the Attorney General a right to intervene to defend the statute on the
government's behalf). On occasions when the Attorney General, representing the Execu-
tive Branch, decides not to appeal a court decision affecting a statute's constitutionality, she
must give notice to the Senate, which then has the right to defend the statute. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 288k(b) (1994).
11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
12 See infra notes 105-63 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 86:831834
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We see, then, that the avoidance canon's operation can create
two distinct kinds of conflicts. With respect to the Executive, the
avoidance canon threatens actual and direct conflict because it disre-
gards the Executive's power and duty to see to the faithful execution
of the laws, including the Constitution. In contrast, the conflict be-
tween Court and Congress that the avoidance canon was designed to
avert-the inherent confrontation that arises whenever the Court un-
dertakes even to decide a constitutional question-is hypothetical and
indirect.
My proposal is simply that the canon be abandoned-that courts
should interpret statutes without the background norm that constitu-
tionally troublesome readings are impermissible. Courts would no
longer be in the position of refusing to permit law executors to imple-
ment the law as they see fit because their preferred course might be
(not is) unconstitutional, even though that preferred course might
well be perfectly consistent with the law as established by Congress.
On the contrary, the Executive's reading of a statute will stand or fall
on its own merits-on whether it is consistent with traditional stan-
dards of statutory construction and comports with the Constitution-
without also having to survive what is effectively a court-imposed,
heightened standard for what the Constitution itself requires. To the
degree that the Executive seeks to execute the laws through statutory
interpretations that are actually unconstitutional, inter-branch comity
and the constitutional structure of separated powers would not be
harmed by the Court's saying so.
The Article has three parts. Part I traces the development of the
canon, its grounding in legislative supremacy, and the anti-democratic
character of judicial review in a system of separated powers. Part II
then recounts the traditional critiques of the avoidance canon, while
refining and expanding those arguments. Part In of the Article
moves beyond the traditional focus of critiques of the avoidance ca-
non on relations between Court and Congress, and turns attention to
the effect of the canon on the relationship between the Court and the
Executive. Part III argues that the avoidance canon does particular
harm to the separation of powers in contexts when Congress has dele-
gated law-elaboration authority to the Executive. In such situations,
the avoidance canon comes into conflict with both the power of the





DEVELOPMENT OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON AND ITS
CONVENTIONAL MODERN AccouNT
According to the conventional understanding, judicial review is
an exceptional event for the simple reason that it rests on the assump-
tion that the Court can legitimately render ineffective the product of
the democratic lawmaking process. 13 Thus, every case involving the
question of whether an act of Congress14 is unconstitutional literally
entails a constitutional confrontation between the Court and Con-
gress. 15 Given the dramatic character ofjudicial review, the Court has
from the beginning taken care to minimize the frequency of that con-
frontation-that is, the number of occasions on which it undertakes
even to decide a constitutional question. Out of respect for Congress as
the most representative branch, 16 and out of defensive instincts lest its
institutional capital be squandered, 17 the Court has steadfastly ad-
hered to the principle of necessity: it refuses to decide a constitutional
question unless it must.'
One can trace this principle's roots to the initial justifications for
judicial review itself. In Marbury v. Madison,19 Chief Justice Marshall
grounded the power ofjudicial review largely in the obligation to pre-
fer the fundamental law of the Constitution to ordinary law in the
course of discharging the judicial duties Article III assigned to the
13 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 3-4 (1962); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 4 (1980); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN
JUDiCIAL RmVEW 9-10 (1986);James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 149 (1893).
14 I am concerned in this Article mainly with federal statutes and the Supreme
Court's interpretive stances as to them. The federal courts' power of judicial review ex-
tends, of course, to actions taken by states, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 342 (1816), but the power authoritatively to interpret state laws does not, Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1945). Thus, as a formal matter the Court does not have
the ability to interpret state laws to avoid constitutional questions; sometimes, however, the
Court, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. CL 2597, 2615 (2000), or individual Justices, id. at 2648
(Thomas, J., dissenting), recognize that the avoidance canon should be applied even with
respect to state laws. They do so, however, without attending to the complexities added by
the fact that the Court's posture in interpreting state law is generally to accept the State's
own construction. But see id. at 2614-15 (rejecting the Attorney General's interpretation of
the state statute). Although issues involving the Court's proper interpretive stance when
state laws pose serious constitutional doubts are interesting, they are not the subject of this
Article.
15 See Thayer, supra note 13, at 130 (calling this a "remarkable power").
16 Cf. ELY, supra note 13, at 4-5.
17 ROBERT G. MCCLosKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 13 (2d ed. 1994).
18 Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S,
288, 345-46 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); cf. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLI.
VAN, CONSTITrTONAL LAW 28-29 (13th ed. 1997) (speaking of this principle in the context
of advisory opinions).
19 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Court. 20 If, as Marbury established,judicial review isjustified by Article
II's case-deciding dictate, it is also justified only insofar as the case-
deciding function makes necessary. The Court presumes that the leg-
islature acts in accordance with the Constitution, and the Court has
no power even to consider the possibility that the legislature has not,
unless a case or controversy forces it to.2'1
The avoidance canon, as it was originally conceived, fit nicely into
this account of judicial review. In Murray v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy,22 the case that many view as containing the germs of the avoid-
ance canon,23 Chief Justice Marshall noted that "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains."24 Although the "law of nations" was
not at the time,25 and is generally not now,2 6 the same as the law of
the United States Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall (while riding
Circuit) later developed from this idea the maxim that "a just respect
for the legislature requires" that the constitutionality of its laws "not
be unnecessarily and wantonly assailed."27 The Court should presume
that Congress, as the lawmaking body, has legislated constitutionally;
and as an unrepresentative body should avoid inserting itself in a man-
ner that rejects the product of the democratic process. Part of the
judicial function, as Chief Justice Marshall saw it, was to construe the
legislature's work to avoid even raising doubts as to its constitutional-
ity.28 But Chief Justice Marshall said, "[i]f [constitutional questions]
become indispensably necessary to the case, the court must meet and
decide them."29 Thus, the necessity principle and the avoidance ca-
non were connected from the outset 30 The Court's subsequent prac-
20 Id. at 179-80.
21 Cf Letter from JohnJay to George Washington (August 8, 1773), in 15 TilE PAPERes
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 111 n.1 (H. Syrett ed. 1969) (refusing to issue advisory opinions
to President Washington).
22 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
23 See Schauer, supra note 8, at 73 n.9. But sce Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constntion,
85 GEo. LJ. 1945, 1948 n.13 (1997) (attributing the inception of the canon to Mossman v.
Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800)).
24 Charming Bets, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
25 See id. (applying this doctrine to avoid a construction that would "violate neutral
rights, or... affect commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as under-
stood in this country").
26 SeeBLAc's LAW DIcIoNARY 886 (6th ed. 1990) (referring to "[international lau,").
27 Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Gas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558).
28 See id.
29 I&
30 It is fair to say that Chief Justice Marshall did not uniformly interpret statutes to
avoid deciding constitutional questions, inasmuch as Afarbuiy has long been recognized as
having adopted a statutory construction that led the Court to decide constitutional issues
that would othenvise not have been raised on a more natural reading of the statute. See
McCLosKEY, supra note 17, at 26-27; William W Van Alstyre, A Critical Guide to Marbury v.
Madison, 1969 DURE IJ. 1, 8.
2001]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tice validated Chief Justice Marshall's admonition in Charming Betsy
and in Ex parte Randolph that courts were, if possible, to interpret stat-
utes to avoid deciding constitutional questions.
It has been well-chronicled that the Court generally used its
power ofjudicial review cautiously and sparingly, at least with respect
to the federal government, for virtually the entire nineteenth cen-
tury.31 The avoidance canon, however, was far from a prominent part
of the Court's work for the remainder of that century. Although trea-
tises of the times mentioned the canon, 32 it showed up only occasion-
ally in the work of the Supreme Court.33 The reasons for this are easy
to speculate upon-for example, by virtue of simple chronology,
there were not many federal statutes with which to deal. Moreover,
under our predominantly common law system and the regime of Swift
v. Tyson,3 4 the business of the Supreme Court was to develop the gen-
eral law that would govern in federal courts.35 Thus, cases involving
statutes were relatively rare, and cases involving constitutional chal-
lenges to federal statutes were rarer still. In addition, and perhaps
most significantly, the interpretive standards of the time treated the
mere existence of constitutional doubts as insufficient reason to invali-
date a statute; thus, as Professor Nagle has noted, "if a court deter-
mined that an interpretation of a statute simply raised doubts about
its constitutionality, the court abided by that interpretation and re-
jected the constitutional challenge."36
As our legal and social institutions developed, however, the Su-
preme Court became less willing to stand by and permit legislatures to
impinge upon then-accepted notions of private rights to liberty of
31 After striking down Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in Marbuy, the Court
did not invalidate another significant federal statute until five decades later when it invali.
dated the Missouri Compromise. SeeScott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1856);
BICKEL, supra note 13, at 14.
32 See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONsrrrvmONAL LIMITATIONS 184
(Special ed. 1987; 1st ed. 1868) (noting "that the court, if possible, must give the statute such a
construction as will enable it to have effrc'); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES
WHICH GovWRN STATUTORY AND CONSrITUTIONAL LAW 312-13 (1857) ("It has been said that
it is a safe and wholesome rule, to adopt the restricted construction of a statute when a
more liberal one will bring us in conflict with the fundamental law.").
33 But see Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407, 422 (1908) (employing the avoidance ca.
non); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (same); Grenada County Supervisors
v. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261, 269 (1884) (same); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
268, 309 (1870) (same); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 75 (1838) (same);
Rutherford v. Greene's Heirs, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 196, 203 (1817) (same).
34 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (establishing a role for federal common law), over.
ruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35 See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1245, 1256 (1996).
36 John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1495,
1510 (1997).
[Vol. 86:831
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contract and property.37 The constitutional history is familiar-the
Lochnei3s era followed, and the Court struck down many of these sorts
of statutes under notions of substantive due process now considered
illegitimate.39 Thus, although the political culture increasingly came
to view statutes as a legitimate and normal means of setting policy,
specific measures were always constitutionally vulnerable. 40 In this
context, principles of judicial restraint became important to judges
who opposed the aggressiveness of Lochner-style judicial review, and
who instead took seriously traditional notions of legislative
supremacy.
41
At the same time, the Court transformed the nature of the avoid-
ance canon. Until early in this century, the avoidance canon was gen-
erally about preferring a statutory reading that met constitutional
scrutiny to one that was actually unconstitutional.42 First in Hariman
v. Interstate Commerce Commission,43 and then definitively in United States
ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,44 the Court subtly but
significantly changed the avoidance canon into a principle of avoiding
statutory interpretations that merely raise serious constitutional
doubts.45 As the Court put it in Delaware & Hudson, "where a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such ques-
tions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter."46
37 SeeVilliam N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction
to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. S.crs, THE LEAL PROCESS, at liv-lvi (William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) [hereinafter HART & SAcKS]; Roscoe Pound,
Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 383-84 (1908).
38 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
39 Of course, the Court did not strike down all (or even most) such measures. From
1905 through the New Deal revolution, the Court struck down some 200 social and eco-
nomic regulations and upheld about the same number. GEoFrREY R. STo.E ET At-, Comm.
TurruoAL L w 829 (3d ed. 1996). The point here is that the Court's interpretative
stance-its attitude-was dramatically different; it was far less tolerant of constitutional
doubts and more willing to step in, even if it did not always do so. See id. at 830-34 (giving
representative examples of both outcomes).
40 See, eg., Robert L Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspcdel,, 38 Sr,%.u. L Rv.
1189, 1229-36 (1986) (describing the Court's activity in the Lordinerem).
41 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); me also
Thayer, supra note 13, at 155-56 (advocating limitingjudicial review to expand legislative
power).
42 Professor Nagle has explored the ambiguous circumstances in which courts in the
nineteenth century appeared to rely on what he calls the "doubts canon" ("modem avoid-
ance," in my parlance) prior to Harriman and Delaware & Hudson. Nagle, supra note 36, at
1510-12. Apart from a few instances of ambiguous reference to a doubts canon, "the bal-
ance of the nineteenth century cases left little doubt" that the canon was about avoiding
readings of statutes that were actually unconstitutional. Id. at 1512.
43 211 U.S. 407 (1908). Harriman is the subject of an illuminating discussion in Pro-
fessor Nagle's article. See Nagle, supra note 36, at 1510-11.
44 213 U.S. 366 (1909).
45 See id. at 408; Harriman, 211 U.S. at 418.
46 Delaware & Hudson, 213 U.S. at 408.
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The change from the original version of the avoidance canon
(which others have termed "classical avoidance" 47) to its current form
(known as "modern avoidance" 48 ) was significant. Every instance in
which the Court invoked classical avoidance precluded a direct consti-
tutional confrontation between the Court and Congress. 49 In cases of
classical avoidance, without invocation of the avoidance canon, the
result would have been a holding that Congress acted unconstitution-
ally.50 Thus under classical avoidance, the Court was able to defer to
the norm of legislative supremacy precisely up to the constitutional
line. If the best reading of the statute raised a serious constitutional
question but was nonetheless in fact constitutional, then it would be
given effect; on the other hand, if that reading was unconstitutional,
then the claim of legislative supremacy had to give way to the de-
mands of the Constitution. 51 At that point, the Court had two
choices, either to adopt another permissible reading of the statute
that was constitutional, or to give effect to the best reading and
thereby doom the statute to a ruling of unconstitutionality.52 Recog-
nizing, even in those pre-realist times, that statutes can be susceptible
to more than one reasonable reading, the classical avoidance canon
took the view that a court should prefer a permissible, even if not an
optimal, reading of the statute to which it can give effect to a pure
statutory reading that it must strike down.53
Classical avoidance, however, led to some awkwardness. First, a
court could not recognize the circumstances calling for its invocation
until it had first effectively engaged in judicial review and concluded
that a particular reading of a statute would render it unconstitu-
tional.54 At that point, the canon obliged the court to adopt a differ-
ent, but still permissible, interpretation, 55 which then had the effect of
appearing to turn into dicta what had come before. Because this
placed the Court in the apparent position of rendering advisory opin-
ions on constitutional questions, it shifted to the doctrine of the mod-
em avoidance canon in Delaware & Hudson.5 6 As the Court stated in
an oft-quoted portion of the opinion:
47 Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1949.
48 Id.
49 See id. at 1958-59.
50 See id. at 1959.
51 See generally Nagle, supra note 36, at 1498-1512 (describing the historic practice
under classical avoidance).
52 See Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1959.
53 United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 75 (1838).
54 Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1958.
55 Id. at 1959.




And unless this rule [the avoidance canon] be considered as mean-
ing that our duty is to first decide that a statute is unconstitutional
and then proceed to hold that such ruling was unnecessary because
the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which causes it not to be
repugnant to the Constitution, the rule plainly must mean that
where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other
of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the
latter.5 7
Thus, in Delaware & Hudson the Court moved to the rule of modem
avoidance-that courts should avoid interpretations even raising serious
constitutional doubts-in order to avoid rendering advisory opinions on
constitutional questions.
58
In the wake of Delaware & Hudson, the doctrine of modem avoid-
ance became part of the constitutional culture.-9 Seven years later,
Justice Holmes could state definitively that "[a] statute must be con-
strued, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is
unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score." ru Justice
Brandeis later produced his famous concurrence in Ashwander v.
TVA, 61 among the most influential concurring opinions in the Court's
history.62
In his Ashwander concurrence, Justice Brandeis provided the most
sustained judicial defense of the notion that the Court defers to Con-
gress and thereby serves the separation of powers by not deciding con-
stitutional questions. 65 ForJustice Brandeis, it was fundamental to the
constitutional structure-to the separation of powers-that the judici-
ary not exercise judicial review unless all alternative grounds for deci-
sion have been exhausted.64 Only then, when there is no other
option, is it proper for the Court to take on the constitutional con-
frontation that inheres in the very act of deciding a constitutional is-
sue.65 In service of this principle, Justice Brandeis catalogued a series
of interpretive principles that fleshed out the command that courts
57 Id. at 408.
58 Nagle, supra note 36, at 1518 (observing that classical avoidance "smacks ofan advi-
sory opinion").
59 Id at 1495.
60 United States v.Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (citing Ddaware &Hudson,
213 U.S. at 408).
61 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
62 Nagle, supra note 36, at 1495 (calling it a "famous" opinion).
63 Ashwande, 297 U.S. at 345 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
64 See id. at 34648 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (putting forth a series of rules designed
to avoid constitutional questions).
65 Id. at 345 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Jane S. Schacter, MAeadetrcraty: The
Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 H.v. L REx. 593, 593 (1995)




not intervene on constitutional grounds unless absolutely necessary.60
The avoidance canon, in its modem form, was among those
principles.
67
Justice Brandeis grounded his stance against unnecessary deci-
sion of constitutional cases in Article III's case or controversy require-
ment.68 As passive instruments of government, courts were not to do
anything unless parties came before them with a genuine legal dis-
pute.69 Thus, federal courts are not empowered to issue advisory
opinions, even when the parties seem to think that they are embroiled
in a genuine legal dispute.70 The ban on advisory opinions applies, of
course, to all litigation in federal courts, constitutional or otherwise.
7 1
In constitutional cases, though, the Court has been even more stingy;
indeed, the Court regularly has said that its obligation is to avoid de-
ciding constitutional questions unless there is no alternative.7 2 And
the fundamental reason for the case or controversy requirement is
simply that the proper resolution of the problem (if it is to be resolved
by the federal government at al173 ) is otherwise within the purview of
Congress or the Executive.
7 4
On this conventional Ashwander account,75 the avoidance canon
seeks to serve the substantive end of preserving the separation of pow-
ers. The Court's reluctance to decide constitutional questions even
within genuine cases or controversies is bottomed on respect for the
boundaries between legislative and judicial power. Nearly contempo-
raneously with the Ashwander concurrence came the end of the Loc-
ner era,76 and the Court's acceptance that in all but the most
extraordinary circumstances it is inappropriate to second-guess legisla-
tive policy judgments on constitutional grounds.7 7 As the Court put it
66 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
68 Id. at 345-46 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
69 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
70 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).
71 E.g., Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 255-56 (1850) (dismissing a contract
action for lack of controversy).
72 E.g., Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947) (following "a policy of
strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues").
73 Similar concerns are present in the Court's treatment of issues concerning the pre-
rogatives of the States in the federal system, including so-called plain statement rules. See,
e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1994); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
74 See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 361 (denying that the Court is a "body with revisory power
over the action of Congress").
75 See Schauer, supra note 8, at 83-84.
76 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
77 Of course, the Court's hands-off attitude has been mainly in the area of what it
terms social and economic legislation. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 153 n.4 (1938) (opening the possibility ofjudicial review in the context of "discrete
and insular minorities"). The last halft-century has witnessed an enormous expansion of
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a decade later, "if government is to function constitutionally," courts
must "keep within [their] power" by adhering to a rule of strict neces-
sity by which they will not consider any constitutional issue unless
there is no alternative.78 In the wake of the Ashwander concurrence
and the New Deal repudiation of the Loclner era it thus became an
accepted part of our separation of powers culture that legislative
supremacy dictated that the Court decide constitutional questions
only when there was no other alternative.
II
TBE AvomrDNcE CANON AND LEGISLATIVE SUPRIACY
A. The Avoidance Canon's Grounding in Legislative Supremacy
Although scholars have debated the degree to which the Consti-
tution adopts a system of legislative supremacy,79 the avoidance canon
unreservedly accepts a strong version of legislative supremacy as the
foundation of constitutional adjudication. 80 The avoidance canon
and similar doctrines, such as the presumption of constitutionality)'
and the doctrine of severability, 82 are required by "a decent respect
due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative
body."83 The avoidance canon self-consciously recognizes and seeks
to respect Congress's primacy in the sphere of lawmaking.
Unlike some canons of interpretation, then, the avoidance canon
is not a rule of construction designed to aid in resolving ambiguities
in the law.84 On the contrary, the avoidance canon is "a default
rule[ ] that implement[s] substantive interpretive, institutional, and
distributive policies."85 In other words, the avoidance canon is a legal
the Court's willingness to intervene in other contexts. See Gum mi & Suv , Supra note
18, at 516. Even in these other contexts, however, the Court has adhered to the principle
of the avoidance canon. Rloppenberg, Fre Speed& Concern supra note 8, at 3. My point
here is simply that the necessity principle so influentially stated by the Ashwander concur-
rence gained its acceptance as part of a legal culture that accepted legislative supremacy in
tandem with the rejection of Lochner-style judicial scrutiny of legislation.
78 Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947).
79 Infra note 95.
80 See Philip P. Frickey, Interpreaalion on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democ-
racy, 1996 ANN. SuRv. A.t. L 477, 512-17.
81 See, eg., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827).
82 See Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1950-55.
83 Ogden, 25 U.S. at 270.
84 See ,I.L.J.A N. ESRRIDGE, JR. ET At-, LFGts.%TioS xo STAtrORv l,,7-"'r,oN
329-30, 34849 (2000); Cf. FRIENDLY, supra note 7, at 210-11 (citing Textile Workers Union %,
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 477 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); Richard A. Posner,
Stattoy Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cmn. L REV. 800, 816
(1983) ("[The canon] shifts the plane of analysis from [interpretation] to that of maintain-
ing a proper separation of powers."); David L Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 921, 927-34 (1992) (listing several "linguistic [c]anons7).
85 Adrian Vermeule, Interprehte CJoice, 75 N.Y.U. L RE%. 74, 85 (2000).
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rule that allocates authority in the system in the pursuit of a substan-
tive policy judgment.8 6 The policy judgment underlying the avoid-
ance canon (and avoiding unnecessary constitutional litigation as a
general matter) is that the Court has a responsibility to respect Con-
gress's role in the constitutional scheme.8 7 The Court has said that
because Congress "is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Con-
stitution," the Court is obliged to indulge any possible construction
that avoids constitutional difficulties.88 To follow any other course
would be to disregard the "Court's appropriate place within [the fed-
eral system's] structure."89 Because Congress has the lawmaking
power under Article 1,90 and because Congress presumably intends to
legislate within constitutional bounds, the Court is bound to interpret
the legislature's work in any way that will result in its validationY1 Jus-
tice Brennan summed up the typical justification for the avoidance
canon as "confin[ing] the judiciary to its proper role in construing
statutes, which is to interpret them so as to give effect to congressional
intention."92 Justice Breyer recently elaborated for the Court:
The doctrine seeks in part to minimize disagreement between the
branches by preserving congressional enactments that might other-
wise founder on constitutional objections. . . . [T]he doctrine
serve[s] [the] basic democratic function of maintaining a set of stat-
utes that reflect, rather than distort, the policy choices that elected
representatives have made.93
It is worth emphasizing again the important connection between
the doctrine of legislative supremacy and the system's traditional wari-
ness of the counter-majoritarian institution of judicial review. Simi-
larly, courts and commentators have worried for generations about
judicial review precisely because legislative supremacy is a fundamen-
tal premise of democratic self-government. In a democracy, those
with electoral mandates-and thus electoral accountability-ought
generally to make policy through law. Thus, the insight that judicial
review is a "remarkable practice"94 in this country is based entirely on
the fact that it places the judicial department in the position of re-
jecting the product of the democratic lawmaking process. Good rea-
86 ESKRIUDGE Er AL., supra note 84, at 339, 348; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VKND.
L. Rzv. 593, 598-99 (1992); Vermeule, supra note 85, at 85.
87 ESRIDGE ET AL., supra note 84, at 348.
88 EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
89 Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 570 (1947).
90 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
91 See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827).
92 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 511 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998).
94 Thayer, supra note 13, at 130.
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sons support placing judges in this position; but our traditional and
strong preference for ensuring that policy judgments have a demo-
cratic pedigree explains our constitutional tradition that the judicial
branch is bound to defer to the legislature's judgment absent a very
good, constitutionally grounded reason.95 Even when the legislature's
policy choices are harsh and seem unreasonable, the Courts have no
power "to soften the dear import of Congress' chosen words."96
The avoidance canon is part of how this tradition of legislative
supremacy is implemented.9 7 Thus the canon dictates that judges re-
frain from wielding the power of judicial review if there is a statutory
construction available to avoid doing so. Time and again, the Court
has been plain about this value. "Where a case in this court can be
decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal
Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed from
without important reasons."98 The Court has been emphatic: "(i]f
there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the pro-
cess of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on
questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoida-
95 How "strong" this principle of legislative supremacy ought to be is, to be sure, open
to debate. See, eg., vflliara N. Eskridge,Jr., Spinningegislaive Supremac, 78 GEO. LJ. 319,
322 (1989) (arguing that it is wrong to suppose that the legislature can really bind judges
by their words, and thatjudges inevitably will make policy in dte interpretation of statutes);
Daniel A- Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislati'e Suprenagy, 78 GEo. UJ. 281, 292-93
(1989) (questioning legislative supremacy and arguing thatjudges are not bound to defer
to expectations of legislators that have not been clearly expressed). Although the)' differ as
to the degree of legislative clarity that is accomplished in the real world, Professors Farber
and Eskridge essentially argue that in the absence of such darityjudicial policy-making is
inevitable and legitimate. In Professor Farber's words, even a weak conception of legisla-
tive supremacy "may allow courts to go beyond (but not against) clear legislative intent."
Farber, supra, at 282. There is room for disagreement, to be sure, on the degree of harm
(if any) done to the constitutional structure when a court implements its policy preference
where the legislature has not been clear. Certainly the harm done to the separation of
powers in such instances is not comparable to the harm done byjudicial flouting of a dear
legislative command. For purposes of this Article, it does not matter how strongly devoted
one is to legislative supremacy as a general matter. The point is that the avoidance canon
(and the Court's traditional aversion to unnecessarily deciding constitutional questions) is
self-consciously premised upon the Court's respecting Congress's role as the prirmary
lawmaker. Cf. Thayer, supra note 13, at 130.
96 United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985).
97 It is worth emphasizing that my argument in this Part does not depend upon the
adoption of any particular theory of statutory interpretation. What I do claim is that the
Court has conceived andjustified the avoidance canon based upon a faithful agent theory
of statutory interpretation grounded in legislative supremacy, and that commentators have
generally analyzed the canon on those terms. It is on those terms, therefore, that I criticize
the canon. It is possible, of course, that one might attempt to defend the canon against my
critique by arguing that the avoidance canon is simply part of the judicial power to adopt
policy-based norms of litigation, and that its failure to respect legislative supremacy (and
the role of the Executive) is simply beside the point. Neither die courts nor commentators
have offered such a defense, however, and I shall not address the point further.
98 Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.1L, 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
2001]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ble."99 In short, the avoidance canon rests on the premise that the
legislature is supreme within the lawmaking sphere, and that the
Court's role in statutory cases is simply to be the faithful agent imple-
menting the legislative will.1 °
B. Traditional Critiques of the Avoidance Canon
Commentators have criticized the avoidance canon on two gen-
eral grounds. First, critics have suggested that in practice the canon
does not serve the value of legislative supremacy. Second, critics have
argued that both in fact and in theory the canon does not avoid the
unnecessary making of constitutional law. Both claims, then, rest on
the fundamental ground that the avoidance canon fails to serve its
asserted purposes. 1 1
1. The Avoidance Canon's Illusory Respect for Legislative Supremacy
Critics have focused first on the question whether the avoidance
canon in fact serves the underlying structural value of legislative
supremacy. On analysis, the assumption that the avoidance canon
serves legislative supremacy turns out to be oversimplified. First, given
the complexities of the legislative process, it might well be that Con-
gress would want a statute to be construed in a manner that makes the
constitutional question unavoidable. Second, it is no service to Con-
gress, no great act of deference, to construe a statute in a manner
contrary to its text and history in order to avoid even confronting a
constitutional doubt. Indeed, the Court has recognized the latter
point, noting that the avoidance canon is not "a license for the judici-
ary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature."' 0 2
By requiring courts to adopt any plausible interpretation of a stat-
ute that does not raise constitutional doubts, the modern avoidance
canon assumes that Congress never intends to depart from constitu-
tional comfort zones unless it is absolutely clear about it. Such an
99 Spector Motor Sert., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
100 SeeJohn F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 CoLUM. L. Rxv. 1,
10-22 (2001) (describing the role of the faithful agent theory in competing camps of statu-
tory construction). William Eskridge has urged that courts have inherent power to do
equity in implementing a statute, regardless of the legislature's understanding as expressed
through the text or history of the act. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown
Ideal, 96 MicH. L. REv. 1509, 1524 (1998) (book review). This debate over whether the
Constitution takes as a premise a faithful agent theory of statutory interpretation and the
vision of legislative supremacy that underlies that theory, or whether it takes a more free-
wheeling, equitable view of the power of courts is important and interesting. There is no
doubt, however, that the Court has grounded the avoidance canon in the fundamental
constitutional structure, and that the Court has understood part of that structure as includ-
ing legislative supremacy.
101 Frickey, supra note 80, at 512-13.
102 United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985); see also United States v. Mon-
santo, 491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989) (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 680).
[Vol. 86:831846
AVOLD1NG CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
assumption is undefended in the cases, and there seems to be little
reason to believe that experience proves it to be warranted as a gen-
eral matter. 03 Congress might well intend for the law to be inter-
preted in a way that raises constitutional doubts, whether or not
particular members were aware that the statute was approaching the
constitutional line when they voted for it.10 4 In exploring this point, I
will focus in some detail on what are probably the three most promi-
nent avoidance cases.
Consider NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,1'5 a case involving the scope of
coverage of the labor laws enacted between 1935 and 1974.106 The
relevant statute limiting the jurisdiction of the NLRB defined the term
"employer" generally, but excluded several different sorts of organiza-
tions (such as government entities) without addressing religious orga-
nizations specifically.' 07 To Justice Brennan and the three other
dissenters, that was strong evidence that Congress meant for religious
employers not to be excluded from the statute's coverage.' 03 On top
of that, Justice Brennan pointed to legislative history indicating that
Congress had considered excluding religious employers, but in the
end decided not to include such a provision in the statute. 09 Thus,
Justice Brennan argued fairly persuasively that the Court had en-
dorsed a reconstruction, rather than a fair construction, of the stat-
ute.110 The Court, on the other hand, noted the longstanding canon
that statutes are to be construed to avoid even raising serious constitu-
tional questions and that extending the labor laws to religious employ-
ers would implicate serious First Amendment issues."' Rather than
face those issues unnecessarily, the Court required evidence of an af-
103 SeeLawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Brcahing llieJudidal Monopoly on Consti-
tutional Inteypretation, 66 CHI.-REN L REv. 481,489-90 (1990) (noting that Congress might
well wish for legislation to be interpreted up to the constitutional line); Vermeule, supra
note 23, at 1962 (making the same point).
104 See Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1962.
105 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
106 Id. at 504-06. Harold Krent has offered an excellent analysis of the implications of
the avoidance canon's use in NLRB cases. See Harold J. Krent, Avoidance and Its Costs:
Application of the Clear Statement Rule to Supreme Court Review of NLRB Casis- 15 Cos.N. L RE%,.
209 (1983).
107 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 512-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 514-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109 d. at 512-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 499504. The Court, perhaps to its credit inasmuch as it did not decide the
case on this basis, was unclear about the specifics of the First Amendment doubts. Id. The
Court seemed more concerned, however, with the possibility of excessive entanglement
between the government (in the form of the NLRB) and religious schools than it seemed




firmative congressional intent to cover religious organizations. 112 Be-
cause the statute was silent on the question whether it covered
religious employers-even though such employers fit within its gen-
eral definition of employers-the Court concluded that Congress had
not granted the NLRB jurisdiction over religious organizations.
1 13
Kent v. Dulles"1 4 is another, and perhaps more famous, example of
how the avoidance canon operates in the context of general statutory
language that, if applied as written, would raise constitutional con-
cerns. In Kent the Court narrowly construed the grant of statutory
authority to the Secretary of State to issue passports as not allowing
him to deny passports to Communists or those who refused to state
under oath that they were not Communists." 5 Although on its face
the statute at issue did not limit the Secretary's authority, the Court
nonetheless imposed a limiting construction.'
1 6
The Court's statutory construction was based upon a close anal)-
sis of the history of passport legislation and the Secretary of State's
historic practices relating to granting and denying passports.1 1 7 The
Secretary's statutory grant of authority, which was established in 1926,
provided that the Secretary was empowered to grant passports to citi-
zens subject to regulations that the President deemed fit to promul-
gate." 8 It was not until 1952, however, that passports became
mandatory for those wishing to engage in foreign travel." 9 Prior to
that time, the Secretary of State was empowered to issue passports,
and the amendment of the statutory scheme in 1952 to establish the
requirement (rather than just the option) of a passport did not ad-
dress-either to expand or retract-the scope of the Secretary's au-
thority.120 After Congress passed the 1952 Act, the Secretary
promulgated the regulations at issue, which forbade the issuance of
passports to persons who were members of the Communist Party or
who engaged in activities that supported the Communist Party.
12 1
Against this complex statutory and regulatory background, the
Court concluded that the Secretary was not authorized by law to deny
112 Id. at 501. On the contrary, a 1974 amendment to the statute extending its cover-
age to nonprofit hospitals did allow employees with religious scruples againstjoining labor
organizations to forgo union membership so long as an amount equivalent to union dues
was donated to charity. Id. at 506. The negative implication of this amendment might
reasonably be that Congress otherwise expected religious institutions to be covered.
113 Id. at 507.
114 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
115 Id. at 130.
116 id. at 127-30.
117 Id. at 121-29.
118 Id. at 123-26 (recounting the history of United States passport legislation).
119 Id. at 121-22.
120 I&
121 Id. at 117-18.
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passports to Communists. 22 The Court refused to assume that in fail-
ing to qualify its delegation of authority, Congress meant for it to be
unqualified.1 23 The Court defended this narrowing of the general
statutory language based on the assumption that Congress would have
wanted it to interpret the law that way.'2 4 Congress's delegation of
passport authority, the Court said, was implicitly limited to the extent
that the exercise of that authority raised serious constitutional
concerns.
125
The opinions in Catholic Bishop and Kent share an important fea-
ture that illuminates the assumptions underlying the avoidance ca-
non. Once a serious constitutional issue appeared on the horizon, the
Court in both cases adopted an interpretive posture that required the
government affirmatively to establish that Congress intended to au-
thorize the conduct at issue. In Catholic Bishop, the Court stated that
as a matter of statutory construction it would require "the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed" to authorize the chal-
lenged conduct before it would reach the constitutional issue.12 6 In
Kent, the Court emphasized that in the context of an apparent
abridgement of a constitutional freedom, it would "hesitate to impute
to Congress ... a purpose to give [the Secretary of State] unbridled
discretion to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen for any sub-
stantive reason he may choose."'2 7 Absent a provision of such author-
ity "in explicit terms," the Secretary may not deny passports "to restrict
the citizens' right of free movement."'
2 8
Except for relying on general notions of legislative supremacy,
the Court has not defended its assumption about legislative prefer-
ences. In both Kent and Catholic Bishop-and probably as a general
matter-the assumption that Congress would want its work construed
to avoid even raising a constitutional doubt is questionable as a matter
of fact. In both Catholic Bishop 29 and Kent'5 0 the statutory language
was general and unqualified; and ordinarily, of course, the language
chosen by Congress is the best evidence of its intent.13 1 Nor in either
case was there anything in the statutory background to suggest any
122 Id. at 130.
123 See id. at 129-30.
124 Id. at 130.
125 Id.
126 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501. The Court drew the quoted language from MeCul.
loch v. Socedad Naional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963), which in turn
drew from Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
127 Kent, 357 U.S. at 128.
128 Id. at 130.
129 440 U.S. at 512-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130 357 U.S. at 127.
131 Eg., United States R.R. Ret. Ed. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); United States v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
2001]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
understanding by members of Congress that the general statutory lan-
guage should be qualified through judicial interpretation. In Catholic
Bishop, the statute at issue expressed a congressional policy choice that
workers should have the right to union representation if they so
chose.13 2 In Kent, the statute at issue expressed the policy choice that
the Secretary of State was to have the power to grant passports for
reasons as he saw fit.'33 But in both cases the Court imputed an intent
to Congress to limit the effective reach of the statutory language that
was enacted into law.
That imputation of intent to Congress under the avoidance ca-
non was based upon the Court's own speculation about what Congress
would have wanted. As a general matter, though, it is fair to wonder,
"why [should] the legislature... care that its statute raises a constitu-
tional question[?]"1 34 Moreover, in Catholic Bishop and Kent, the text
and history of each statute, fairly read, led more readily to the conclu-
sion that Congress would have expected the constitutionally dubious
course to be followed-that the right to organize into bargaining
units should extend to employees of religious institutions and that po-
tentially disloyal Americans should not have passports.
As for the Catholic Bishop scheme, one can easily imagine good
arguments on both sides of that question. On the one hand, there is
no reason to suppose that those voting for the National Labor Rela-
tions Act or its amendments did not want to cover religious employers.
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to expect that some voters in
Congress (it is impossible to say how many) would have wanted to
compromise on the statute's extension to avoid trampling unnecessa-
rily on the autonomy of religious groups. How Congress would have
struck that balance if the question had been squarely posed and voted
upon, however, is a subject of pure speculation. 35 As Professor Krent
132 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 506.
133 Kent, 357 U.S. at 124-25.
134 POSNER, supra note 8, at 284.
135 Here the connection between avoiding constitutional questions and doctrines of
severability is salient. SeeVermeule, supra note 23, at 1947 (giving insightful consideration
to this connection). The Court treats the question whether the unconstitutional portion of
a statute is severable from the remainder as one of congressional intent; to determine
severability, a court is to determine whether Congress would have passed the statute with-
out its unconstitutional provisions. E.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976) (per curiam). This inquiry is necessarily specu-
lative to some degree, even in situations where Congress has included a statutory provision
addressing the question. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 783 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). For present purposes, I simply note that both the avoidance canon and the
doctrine of severability depend upon a hypothetical construction and implementation of
congressional intent. Although the real world consequences of the hypothetical construc-
tion of congressional intent seem more stark in the context of severability analysis, in fact




has noted, the avoidance canon in this context risks "supplanting con-
gressional policy" through the imposition of the Court's preferences
masked as Congress's.
3 6
With respect to Kent, nowadays there does not seem to be much
of an argument for passport denials on ideological grounds. So the
Court's assumption that Congress would not have wanted to permit
that practice seems at first blush to be a reasonable reflection of real-
ity. But recall the times in which the statute at issue was passed. In
1952, when Congress most recently had addressed the passport issue,
there was no reason to think that the legislative branch would have
been more tolerant of Communist sympathizers than the Secretary of
State.'3 7 The assumption of Kent makes a great deal of sense if the
canon invoked were classical avoidance-and it must be said thatJus-
tice Douglas's opinion goes a long way toward stating on the merits
that the Secretary's policy in fact violated the Constitution.' 38 But the
Court explicitly claimed that it was engaging in modem avoidance; it
disclaimed reaching any constitutional question, preferring to rely on
its statutory construction to resolve the case.'3 9 Thus, taken on its own
terms, Kent is an exercise not so much in pure speculation (as was the
case in Catholic Bishop), but in assuming the best of Congress. Again,
though, that assumption is just that-an assumption that did not nec-
essarily reflect the reality of the times.
140
The objection to the Court's reconstruction of legislative intent
goes even further. Public choice theory14 1 suggests that it is impossi-
ble to determine whether legislation in fact reflects the aggregated
preferences of the voting members of a legislature, because a variety
of factors apart from the substance of the measure (such as agenda
control and strategic voting) can affect the outcome of the compli-
cated and expensive legislative process. 142 In the absence of clear lan-
136 Krent, supra note 106, at 212.
137 See Kent, 357 U.S. at 14042 (Clark, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 129-30.
139 Id. at 129.
140 For example, although the Court concluded-based on an assumption and not any
clear expression-that in 1952 Congress had not intended to allow the denial of passports
to Communists, id at 130,just two years earlier Congress had passed a statute affirmatively
barring the application for or granting of a passport to members of Communist organiza-
tions that were subject to registration requirements, id. at 140 (ClarkJ., dissenting).
141 Public choice theory, coupled ith the insights of game theory, seeks to explain the
behavior of political institutions through economic analysis. Seegenerally Dx.'a.A. F,wER
& PHInP P. Fmicr ', LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICz: A C rmrcL LrRoDVcno.Lr (1991) (describing
public choice theory and advocating for its modest role in analysis of law and government);
see also Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Imnoral? The Case for the
"Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. Rxv. 179, 179 (1988) (defining public choice theory).
142 See FARBER & FRICKm; supra note 141, at 38-42; see also Kx',q.mn J. ARsow, Socmi .
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) (setting forth a mathematical theory for
public choice). According to Arrow's Theorem, in a multi-member voting body in vuhich
each member does not have a single preference as to the outcome, majority rule %All not
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guage answering the problem, then, 'Judicial predictions of how the
legislature would have decided issues it did not in fact decide are
bound to be little more than wild guesses."'143 That is even more true
with respect to speculation about what the legislature might have
done had it focused upon the serious constitutional problem posed by
an interpretation of its work and decided whether it nonetheless
would press for such a construction and thus force a constitutional
decision from the courts.
In other words, it is simply not possible to say what the outcome
of the legislative process would have been if the question were put to
the members of both Houses-just how would you have voted on
some hypothetical bill if you knew that the language chosen would
put the courts to the decision of a constitutional question? How
would you have voted had an alternative formulation of the language
been offered before (or after) that language? How would you have
voted for potential amendments? These inquiries are simply unan-
swerable. All we know is that each member voted for (or against) a
particular bill at a particular time. Each might have anticipated the
constitutional problems and concluded that it was worth provoking a
constitutional decision in order to accomplish the goals of the legisla-
necessarily produce a genuine ordering of preferences (even if one assumes that one
exists) because the order in which alternatives are voted upon, and in which alternatives
are placed in competition, determines the outcome. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 141,
at 38-39; Einer R Elhauge, Does Interest Group TheoyJustfy More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.. 31, 101 (1991); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 673, 685 (1997); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It":
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L Rxv. L. & ECON. 239, 242 (1992). In a phenomenon
known as cycling, different majorities can endlessly produce contradictory outcomes un-
less, as a matter of process, voting is ended at some point. Manning, supra, at 685-86 &
n.53. Thus it is that agenda control and vote-trading (logrolling) can arbitrarily determine
the outcome. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 141, at 40-41.
143 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983). 1
should add that the literature analyzing the applicability of public choice theory to statu-
tory interpretation is vast. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESauDGE, JR., DW ANIIC SATtrIorV
INTERPRETATON 7-8 (1994); FARBER & FICKmcY, supra note 141, at 88-106; NEIL K. Koistmkt,
IMPERFEar ALTERNATIVES 193-94 (1994); JERRY L. MASHAvw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVtRN.
ANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 81-105 (1997);Jim Rossi, Public Choice
Theory and the Fragmented Web of the Contemporary Administrative State, 96 MIcH. L. REv. 1746
(1998) (book review) (applying public choice theory to administrative law); cf Linda Co-
hen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 477 (1992) (applying public choice theory
to term limits); Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INr'L
REv. L. & ECON. 145, 147-51 (1992) (applying public choice theory to bicameralism); Pablo
T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process
andJudicial Review, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (1997) (applying this theory to administrative
process and judicial review). And the use of public choice theory in legal scholarship has
been criticized. See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46J. LEGAL EDUC.
490 (1996). The account here is narrow and simplified to make the point that it is guess-
work to attribute a specific intent to Congress with regard to any particular statute as to
how it would choose to have the law interpreted if its members knew that a serious consti-
tutional question was presented.
AVOIDING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
tion. Or each might have refused to vote for a bill that adopted in
plain terms the construction the Court later chose in order to avoid
the constitutional decision, and might have voted for the actual bill
only on the understanding that it did present serious constitutional
difficulties. Or each member of Congress might have voted in igno-
rance of the lurking constitutional difficulties, or might have been
aware of them and indifferent about them. The point is that it is im-
possible after-the-fact to construct what might have happened in the
legislative process had things gone differently. All we have is the bill
that Congress ultimately passed.' 44
To illustrate further these problems, consider United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc.'4 5 That case raised the question whether the Pro-
tection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 contained
a scienter requirement that the defendant knew that minors depicted
in pornography were underage. 146 The statutory text provided that a
person commits a felony if he "knowingly transports or ships in inter-
state or foreign commerce ... any visual depiction, if... the produc-
ing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct. " 147 Reading the statute so that the "know-
ingly" requirement attached only to the transportation in interstate
commerce element of the offense would raise a First Amendment
freedom of speech issue due to the established doctrinal fact that the
First Amendment protects nonobscene pornography involving adults,
but does not protect pornography involving minors.' 48 On the one
hand, under that reading of the statute, a pornographer would face
essentially strict liability if the participants turned out, unbeknownst to
him, to be underage. 4 9 On the other hand, this First Amendment
issue goes away if the "knowingly" requirement is read as modifying
not only the transportation element but also the requirement that the
144 Of course, many commentators offer a more optimistic vision of the Court's role in
statutory interpretation, and urge, even if the text of the statute does not dictate an answer,
that the Court can nonetheless fulfill its role by implementing some version of the legisla-
ture's intent. See, eg., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, LUdatingStalutojy Interpretation, 87 MIcat. L
REv. 20, 23-24 (1988) (describing the argument that courts should try to discern how the
enacting legislature would have answered the specific question); Posner, supra note 84, at
817-21 (arguing that the court should try to imagine what the legislature would want).
Others claim that reviewing courts serve their function by tr)ing to implement the overall
general purpose of the legislation as discerned from all relevant sources of meaning. &e,
eg., ESKRIDrE, supra note 143, at 5-8; HART & &Ac~s, supra note 37, at 1253-54. 1 take no
position here on these questions, except to claim that the avoidance canon's reconstruc-
tion of legislative preferences is not (in the absence of real world evidence) based on actual
data but is instead speculative.
145 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
146 Id. at 68-69.
147 d. at 68 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1) (1994)).
148 See, eg., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-11 (1990).
149 X-Citement Vdeo, 513 U.S. at 69.
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depiction involve the use of a minor.150 In other words, outlawing the
use of minors in pornography if its purveyors knew the age of the
participants raises no freedom of speech problem. 151
Invoking the avoidance canon, the X-Citement Video Court read
the statute as extending the scienter requirement to the age of the
participants as well as the interstate shipment of the materials.' 52 Al-
though the Court acknowledged that as a matter of language its inter-
pretation of the text was difficult to sustain, the serious First
Amendment concerns that would otherwise arise justified such a read-
ing.'53 Thus, attributing an intent on Congress's part not to pass an
unconstitutional statute, the Court read the text in a manner that was
contrary to its apparent meaning. 54
As Professor Schauer has pointed out, there are several problems
with the Court's performance here.155 First, and most saliently, it is
textually difficult to read the adverb "knowingly," which appears di-
rectly before the verb "transports" in the first line of the statutory sec-
tion at issue, as reaching into two subsequent subsections of the
statute which both contain verbs unmodified by any adverb at all.' 50
Here, then, as in Catholic Bishop, the Court misconstrued a statute to
avoid the constitutional confrontation that is inherent any time it un-
dertakes the process of judicial review.' 57 It did so, however, appar-
ently unaware of the lack of respect shown by adopting a wrong
construction of the language that Congress actually wrote.' 58
The Court might respond, however, that Congress obviously
would not intend to pass a constitutionally questionable statute. It is
certainly true that the system presumes that Congress intends to act
constitutionally-it would be lawless for Congress ever to intend oth-
erwise-and for its work product to be construed if possible to be con-
stitutional.15 9 It is quite a different point, however, to assume that
Congress would want its work to be interpreted as not even approach-
ing the constitutional line. Consider the politics of the child pornog-
raphy situation. If we put it to an up or down vote in Congress, it is far
from clear that we could expect the political process to err on the side
of not forcing a constitutional decision if it meant simultaneously reg-
150 Id. at 78.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 69.
153 Id. at 68, 70-73.
154 Id. at 76.
155 Schauer, supra note 8, at 81.
156 X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 80-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157 See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1979).
158 X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 82-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatoy State, 103 HARv. L. Rev. 405,
469 (1989) (noting that the avoidance canon "responds to Congress' probable preference
for validation over invalidation").
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ulating child pornography less completely. The crucial difference is
between a situation in which the best reading of the statute would be
actually unconstitutional and one in which a less-than-best construc-
tion is adopted to avoid even deciding on the statute's constitutional-
ity.' 60 In cases like X-Citement Vueo, the Court has told Congress that it
will not permit the legislature even to come close to the constitutional
line. As others have noted, this creates a judge-made penumbra
around the actual demands of the Constitution and therefore, as a
practical matter, arguably limits the legislative hand even more than
invalidation after engaging in judicial review.16'
How serious is this judicial intrusion? Here it is important to be
precise about what we are analyzing; our conclusions about the
proper interpretive course depend upon an understanding of the dif-
ferent possible points of comparison. The first issue is whether it is
preferable to misinterpret a statute in order to avoid even having to
decide a constitutional question. Defenders of the avoidance canon
might object that this is an unfair scenario to paint; after all, the ca-
non, by its terms, only kicks in if the competing interpretive possibili-
ties are "fair" constructions of the statute.'62 Experience has shown,
however, that the Court's conclusions about the interpretations that
count as "fair" constructions of statutes can be highly dubious.'6
Moreover, the fact that there might be numerous "fair" constructions
of a statute does not mean that there is not one that is best. The very
point of the avoidance canon is to require that even the best construc-
tion of a statute be rejected in favor of a less plausible alternative if the
former raises a serious constitutional question and the latter does not.
So we are back where we started: is the detriment of misinterpreting a
statute (or choosing an interpretation other than the most plausible
one) to be preferred along with the benefit of avoiding judicial
review?
Others have argued persuasively that the answer to this question
is no.'6 The time has long passed when concerns about the legiti-
macy ofjudicial review, or its political acceptability, counseled serious
160 See Nagle, supra note 36, at 1498 (noting the importance of the distinction and
defending construing statutes to avoid actual unconstitutionality).
161 United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1318 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.);
Posner, supra note 84, at 816.
162 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998).
163 See, eg., X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68 (acknowledging that its reading of the stat-
ute was not the most natural or grammatical one available); Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S.
440, 454-55 (1989) (rejecting a "literal reading" of the statute in favor of one that avoided a
constitutional question).
164 See FRIENDLY, supra note 7, at 210-12; Posner, supra note 84, at 816-17; Schauer,
supra note 8, at 97-98; Shapiro, supra note 84, at 947.
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caution about deploying it. 1 6 5 For one thing, for better or worse, our
legal and political culture is accustomed to the idea.166 As one com-
mentator recently said, "[t] oday, judicial review is hardly controver-
sial."167 Moreover, our constitutional history has taught us that
judicial review is not in and of itself threatening to democratic values.
As far back as the time of the founding generation, it was said that
judicial review, when practiced properly, in fact enhances democracy in
important ways.168 Thus, although there is an element of presump-
tuousness in the Court's even undertaking judicial review, the legiti-
macy of the Court's doing so is our unbroken constitutional tradition.
In short, it is no longer the act of judicial review that is troubling.
Rather, it is judicial review done badly. The Court's legitimacy is
threatened not by the act of answering constitutional questions at all,
but by giving the wrong answers to them.
That does not mean, however, that courts ought to be immodest
in their conception of the scope of judicial power. Just as it is our
unbroken tradition that courts engage in judicial review, it is also our
tradition to prefer nonconstitutional grounds for a decision to a con-
stitutional ground.' 69 Thus it makes perfect sense from the stand-
point of the separation of powers for a court to hesitate before
declaring an act of a coordinate department unconstitutional.17 0 Ad-
hering to such traditional policies as a default rule-in order to main-
165 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-46 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (the
Court "for its own governance," and not because of concerns about the legitimacy ofjudli-
cial review, refrains from deciding constitutional cases "confessedly within its jurisdiction"
unless it is necessary to do so); Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569-71 (1947)
(rule of necessity is "basic to the federal system and this Court's appropriate place within
that structure"); Thayer, supra note 13, at 135.
166 SeeJoel K. Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary Explorations,
43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 791, 820 (1999).
167 Id.
168 Indeed, the original and most influential statements supporting the theory ofjudi-
cial review relied on this very argument. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
179-80 (1803) (noting the superior democratic pedigree of the Constitution over statutes
and the vindication of democratic values achieved by striking down unconstitutional laws);
THE FEDERALIsr No. 78, at 578 (Alexander Hamilton) Uohn C. Hamilton ed., 1865)
("[T]he constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to
the intention of their agents."). Modem scholars have emphasized the democracy-enhanc-
ing prospects ofjudicial review. See, e.g., ELY:, supra note 13, at 8-9.
169 E.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville IR., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909); Burton v. United
States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905).
170 See, e.g., RoBERT H. Boiu, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 11 (1990); ELY, supra note 13,
at 4-5; LA URENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 13-15 (2d ed. 1988); Thayer,
supra note 13, at 143-44. In short, commentators from across the political spectrum agree
that the Court ought not to feel free to reject willy nilly on constitutional grounds the acts
of other government actors. Of course, it goes without saying that where one falls on the
spectrum of when courts should intervene in the name of the Constitution, and the rea-
sons why one is willing to let the courts step in, vary widely. But virtually all agree that it is a
serious and sobering act, and not one that ought to be taken lightly.
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tan the proper place of the judicial department within the
constitutional scheme-is unproblematic. Problems arise, however,
when we adhere to traditional devices that are meant to serve that
purpose without giving any attention to whether such devices (in par-
ticular, the avoidance canon) actually disserve the policies they are as-
sumed to advance.
This point becomes even more clear if we compare the nature of
the disrespect courts show Congress when engaging in judicial review
(the simple undertaking to decide a constitutional case) with the level
of disrespect courts show by statutory misinterpretation as the result of
the avoidance canon. Invoking the avoidance canon does not ipso
facto show more respect for Congress. The avoidance canon is not
inherently respectful, and engaging injudicial review is not inherently
disrespectful. As Professor Mashaw has argued, "[a] court that sus-
tains and applies a statute interpreted by reference to [the avoidance]
canon surely shows no greater solicitude for legislative preferences
than does a court that attempts to understand what was meant and
then engages in a serious constitutional analysis of the validity of the
statute."1 7
1
The Court has recognized this as well. Indeed, it has stated the
strongest version of this point directly-that it positively violates the
separation of powers to misconstrue a statute to avoid a constitutional
question. The avoidance canon, the Court says, "is not a license for
the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.... Any
other conclusion, while purporting to be an exercise in judicial re-
straint, would trench upon the legislative powers vested in Congress
by Art. I, § 1, of the Constitution."172 Given the Court's ready and
repeated acceptance of this seemingly obvious point, what accounts
for the Court's stubborn, indeed unquestioning, allegiance to the ca-
non? It is possible that the answer lies in an unstated belief that the
avoidance canon is really about avoiding constructions of statutes that
are outright unconstitutional. That is, it might be that the formal
terms of the canon-avoiding even serious constitutional doubts-fall
to reflect its reality and that the modem avoidance canon in fact is no
different from pre-Delaware & Hudson classical avoidance.
It turns out, however, that the avoidance canon in its modem
form is not necessarily at all about avoiding actual holdings of uncon-
stitutionality. As Professor Vermeule has noted, the Court has repeat-
edly later upheld the constitutionality of legal interpretations that it
171 Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes,
32 WM. & MiARY L. Rtv. 827, 840 (1991).
172 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1997) (citations omitted) (quoting
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)); 5We United States v. Locke, 471 U.S.
84, 95-96 (1985); Heckler v. Matheus, 465 U.S. 728, 741-42 (1984).
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had earlier refused to confront after invoking the avoidance canon.173
So the belief that the avoidance canon in fact avoids only true uncon-
stitutionality is belied by the reality of at least some of the Court's
cases.' 74
An erroneous interpretation of a statute is, in at least one sense,
less damaging to the constitutional structure than the invalidation on
constitutional grounds of an act of Congress. The simple reason why
is that Congress can correct such an error by passing a new statute.
But the comparison between the ease of undoing erroneous statutory
interpretations and difficulty of overturning erroneous constitutional
interpretations oversimplifies matters. In the first place, it might be
that a statute should be struck down in the course of deciding a case; if
Congress has in fact acted unconstitutionally, it does no harm to the
separation of powers for the Court to say so. For instance, in X-Cite.
ment Video, the Court almost certainly would have found unconstitu-
tional the absence of a scienter requirement in the Protection of
Children Against Pornography Act had it interpreted the statute, in its
own terms, by giving it the "most grammatical reading."17 Or, to re-
fer to an example from two generations ago, the Court today likely
would hold unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds 176 (and
right to travel grounds)177 a statute denying citizens passports based
upon their membership in the Communist Party.178 It might well be
that that would have been the right constitutional result in both cases.
This suggests that whether the Court appropriately decided a
constitutional case depends upon the substantive correctness of the
Court's judgment. It is indeed a troubling and significant disruption
to the separation of powers for the Court to give the wrong answer to
such questions. On the one hand, if the Court errs on the side of
unconstitutionality, it has wrongly taken it upon itself to reject the
product of the democratic process. On the other hand, if Congress
has passed an unconstitutional statute, then the right thing (assuming
a proper case or controversy is brought) is for the Court to strike it
down. In that situation, Congress has by definition arrogated to itself
power that it does not possess.
173 Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1960-61 (gathering and discussing examples).
174 Moreover, even if the descriptive claim that the avoidance canon is about avoiding
actual, as opposed to potential, unconstitutionality is true, there is no reason why the Court
should not say so. The avoidance canon should be evaluated, in other words, on its own
terms; if the canon is about something other than what the Court claims, then that is Itself
reason enough to abandon it.
175 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994).
176 See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964) (holding a statute denying
passports to communists unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds).
177 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (implying that refusal to grant a passport on
ideological grounds violates the constitutional right to travel).
178 Id. at 117 n.1.
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One might respond that it is naive to suppose either that statutes
have one true meaning or that the Constitution provides one correct
answer to a question. Thousands of pages of opinions, articles, and
books reflect the lack of agreement on almost every constitutional
question that one can imagine needs answering, t79 as well as the lack
of agreement as a matter of theory that one answer exists.'80 The
avoidance canon itself, however, by taking as a premise that there is a
range of permissible statutory meanings, necessarily also takes as a
premise that there are impermissible statutory meanings. When the
Court points out that the avoidance canon "is not a license for the
judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature,"1 81 it takes as
a premise that the range of permissible constructions is finite-that
there are wrong answers. And interpretive norms generally take the
same premise for interpretation of the Constitution. 83
In light of these premises (which are central to how the legal sys-
tem operates daily), the avoidance canon's devotion to legislative
supremacy becomes even more important. The avoidance canon
takes on faith the idea that the democratically accountable legislature
makes the law and that the Court's role is to offer faithful interpreta-
tions of the legislature's work. The Court is justified in standing in
the legislature's way only if the higher law of the Constitution de-
mands it.183 Both the traditional conception of the Court's job in stat-
utory interpretation as faithfully "giv[ing] effect to the will of
Congress" 1s4 and the avoidance canon's value of invoking the power
of judicial review only when necessary are grounded in the constitu-
tional principle of the separation of powers.
179 The list of citations for these propositions would encompass most of the United
States Reports and the bulk of constitutional law scholarship.
180 See, eg., SvaEN D. S%=r, THE CoNSrTtrrON AND THE PIUDE OF RE,%SON LX (1998)
(endeavoring to "make sense" of "the seeming chaos we call 'constitutional law'"); INuu
TusHirr, RED, NVHrrE, AND BLUE A CRITImcL ArA'tAIaS OF CoxSTmrrrto.t% L w 313 (1988)
(concluding that "the liberal tradition makes constitutional theory both necessary and im-
possible"). Philip Bobbitt has made an influential treatment of the varieties of constitu-
tional arguments that are appropriate to, and persuasive in, different contexts. Se PHiup
BonBrrr, CoNsrrrtnmoNAL FATE 3-122 (1982).
181 United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985).
182 See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfet Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L RLv%. 353, 357-58
(1981).
183 Scholars have perceptively questioned both the theoretical basis for legislative
supremacy in statutory interpretation, see, eg., Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative (onception of
Legislative Supremacy, 42 CAsE W. REs. L REv. 1129, 1129-30 (1992); Eskridge, supra note 95,
at 321-22; Farber, supra note 95, at 281-83; Schacter, supra note 65, at 59396, and the
degree to which in practice the Court actually adheres to traditional norms of legislative
supremacy, see, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authoyit in Statutory Interpretation: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 70 Tx. L. REv. 1073, 1091-1120 (1992). For my purposes, the important
point is that the avoidance canon itself continues to depend on a strong version of legisla.
tive supremacy.
184 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982).
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Thus a statutory misinterpretation, even when motivated by re-
spect for Congress and the separation of powers, works the same kind
of damage to the system as the improper invalidation of a statute. In
both situations, the Court fails to respect the supremacy of the legisla-
ture in the lawmaking sphere. In both situations, the Court says to the
legislature that it cannot have its preferred way. Indeed, as Professor
Mashaw has pointed out, there is something more underhanded
about the damage done by misinterpretation than that done by invali-
dation.185 In the former situation, the system pretends that nothing
has gone awry; in the latter, the Court has solemnly invoked its ulti-
mate power and judged the legislature to have violated our fundamen-
tal law. Thus the Court does not do any more inherent damage to the
separation of powers by striking down a statute erroneously than it
does by saving a statute through interpretive sleight of hand.
And matters are even worse than that. The argument thus far has
compared the damage of actual invalidation with the damage of misin-
terpretation. In fact, however, the avoidance canon is explicitly de-
signed to avoid potential, rather than actual, invalidation. This
distinction provided the basis for the move from classical avoidance to
modem avoidance that the Court's decision in Delaware & Hudson in-
augurated and that Justice Brandeis's Ashwander concurrence ce-
mented into the law. In other words, the avoidance canon claims that
it is essential to avoid even the occasion of sin (the affront to Congress
of merely undertaking the consideration of a constitutionally doubtful
question), rather than the sin itself (actual constitutional invalida-
tion). But there is nothing inherently wrong about either undertak-
ing a constitutional decision or declaring an act of Congress
unconstitutional. And there is nothing inherently right about misin-
terpreting a statute to avoid the occasion for such undertakings.
2. The Avoidance Canon and the Unnecessary Making of
Constitutional Law
The second general criticism of the canon is that it does not
avoid the unnecessary making of constitutional law. In any case in
which the avoidance canon dictates the statutory interpretation, the
argument goes, constitutional values have an impact on the law. To
return to familiar examples, in cases like Kent, constitutional princi-
ples dictated the choice of statutory meaning that becomes the law. 180
185 See Mashaw, supra note 171, at 840.
186 This argument is in some tension with the argument I made above that the avoid-
ance canon is actually a doubts canon because experience shows that the Court sometimes
later upholds the constitutional interpretation that earlier was the source of the doubts
which led the Court to adopt a particular statutory interpretation. See supra note 173 and
accompanying text. This point further undercuts the avoidance canon, however, because
it means that the prior statutory interpretation, which by definition was chosen to avoid
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That means that the constitutional questions that the Court pur-
ported not to decide in fact had a substantive effect on the outcome
of those cases. Absent the constitutional right to travel, a Communist
sympathizer would not be entitled to a passport from the Secretary of
State.187 Absent the right to due process, a criminal defendant would
not be entitled to notice from the district court before it imposes an
upward departure in applying the sentencing guidelines.188 Or absent
the principle of the separation of powers, the American Bar Associa-
tion would have to open its deliberations on judicial nominations to
the public pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 8 9 In a
real sense the Court makes constitutional law every time it invokes the
avoidance canon, but with "a whisper rather with a shout."90 The
very essence of the avoidance canon is to ensure that constitutional
doubts, which might or might not bejustified, dictate the result in the
case.
This sub silentio constitutional law making is problematic. Pro-
fessor Schauer argues that its costs outweigh its benefits,19' and in-
creasingly commentators seem to agree.1 92 The most obvious cost is
that courts give statutes a meaning they would not ordinarily bear in
the service of an illusory principle. What use is it to mangle a statute if
you do not even accomplish the goal of avoiding the making of consti-
tutional law?
Moreover, even if we were to agree that the Court has not formally
made constitutional law, it at least arguably has done so as a practical
matter. For example, it is not difficult to predict a future holding that
a strict liability element regarding the age of underage performers in
pornography violates the First Amendment. And as a result no Con-
gress is likely to force such a holding; thus did the Court's signals in X-
Citement Vueo likely settle as a practical matter the constitutional ques-
tion that it purported to avoid.
The objection to backdoor constitutional law making of this sort
goes even further. Although the Court justifies the avoidance canon
based on the difference in effect between a statutory decision and a
constitutional one-one is correctable through the normal lawmaking
process and the other is only correctable through a constitutional
constitutional doubts, was adopted to no good effect-the statutory interpretation that
earlier gave rise to doubts was in fact later determined to be constitutional.
187 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958).
188 See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138 (1991).
189 See Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989).
19o Schauer, supra note 8, at 88.
191 Id at 97-98.
192 See Kloppenberg, Free Speech Concerms, supra note 8, at 90; cf Nagle, supra note 36, at
1507-08 (suggesting that the avoidance canon upsets the separation of powers more than
the unconstitutionality canon does).
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amendment-that difference in the real world is largely theoretical.
The lawmaking process is complicated and expensive, 195 and com-
mentators have convincingly demonstrated that Congress is unlikely
to pass statutes to overrule any Supreme Court statutory decision.0 4
Although it sometimes happens, such a change requires formidable
forces to bring to bear and likely faces intense opposition. One need
reflect only for a moment on the infrequency of such legislative re-
sponses, 195 and the notorious bitterness of the debate even in in-
stances where Congress passes a responsive law,196 to agree that such
occasions are rare and difficult to accomplish. And the situation is
much more difficult for those wishing to pass a responsive statute
when the Supreme Court decision in question is based on the avoid-
ance canon. 197 The likelihood, in light of the Court's expressed con-
stitutional doubts, that a responsive law would be struck down as
unconstitutional provides an additional and formidable obstacle in
the lawmaking process beyond even the normal difficulties. The ef-
fort to force such a constitutional confrontation hardly seems worth
exerting, and "[i] t is not surprising that no instances" of Congress hav-
ing done so "come to mind."'198
There is even more to the traditional case against the avoidance
canon. The damage done by the canon is greater even than first ap-
pears, because it imposes on constitutional values even when there is
193 SeeJonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Inter-
pretation: An Interest Group Mode4 86 CoLum. L. REV. 223, 229 (1986).
194 SeeLawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It : The Casefor anAbsolute Rule of Statutory
StareDecisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 184-96 (1989). ContraWilliam N. Eskridge,Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutmy Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yntu LJ. 331, 335 (1991).
195 See Beth M. Henschen, Statutory Interpretation of the Supreme Court: Congressional Re-
sponse 11 AM. POL. Q. 441, 445 (1983) (noting, in a study on congressional responses to
Supreme Court labor and antitrust decisions, that "the total number of Supreme Court
decisions to which Congress reacted is quite small").
196 See, e.g., Lena William, Panel Approves a Key Measure to Battle Bias, N.Y. TmES, May 21,
1987, at A22 (reporting the "long and difficult battle" over the Civil Rights Restoration Act
of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994), passed in response to Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S.
555 (1984)). Other civil rights bills intended to undo Supreme Court action have similarly
been controversial. The debates in the public forum-both within Congress and with-
out-over what became the Civil Rights Act of 1991 were notoriously intense. See Steven A.
Holmes, Battle Lines Form on New Rights Bil N.Y. TIMwEs, Feb. 8, 1991, at A16. The legislative
coalition and the political forces that ended up carrying the day had a sympathetic cause (a
series of Supreme Court decisions that appeared to some as willfully anti-civil rights), see
Thumbing His Nose at Congress; Mr. Bush Signs-and Undermines-the Rights Bill N.Y. TIM Es,
Nov. 22, 1991, at A30, and a President who wanted to make political hay by signing a civil
rights bill, id. Even in these circumstances, the law that was enacted was vague and compli-
cated. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 302-33 (1994); Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 256-77 (1994). And the act only became law on its second trip to
the Oval Office, having elicited a presidential veto on its first go-round. Landgraf 511 U.S.
at 255-56.




uncertainty over whether Congress actually has gone too far. This ar-
gument is another variant on the earlier point that the avoidance ca-
non creates a penumbra that Congress may not enter because to do so
would come close to the constitutional line-even though it in fact
might not go over the line.199 In this way, the canon extends the reach
of the Court even further into the lawmaking process than the institu-
tion of judicial review does on its own. Judge Posner has made the
point weli, noting that the avoidance canon makes it practically diffi-
cult for Congress to insist on constitutionally dubious, but nonetheless
lawful, results.200 Kent201 is only one of several ready examples of this
phenomenon. Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court, which con-
cludes that the grant of legislative authority to the Secretary of State to
issue passports did not permit their denial on ideological grounds,202
extends the Court's reach into the legislative process and effectively
makes constitutional law without saying so. To take the latter point
first, Justice Douglas's majority opinion first establishes that the "right
to travel" is part of the liberty the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment guarantees.203 The Court immediately rendered that dis-
cussion-which proved to be influential in the future2 --- dicta, how-
ever, by stating that the case provided no occasion for the Court to
decide whether that constitutional right had been abridged when the
Secretary withheld a passport on the ground that the applicant re-
fused to deny membership in the Communist Party.20 Instead, the
Court resolved the case prior to reaching that constitutional question
by examining the scope of the Secretary's statutory grant of author-
ity.20 6 On what basis, then, could the Courtjustify its discussion of the
constitutional question? Just as in Delaware & Hudson, the founda-
tional case for the modem avoidance canon, the Court pointed to the
ostensible need to establish the premise that the constitutional ques-
tion was serious in order to justify the interpretive choice under the
statute at issue.20 7 In other words, in order to avoid deciding a consti-
199 Judge Richard Posner has made the point persuasively. Ste Pos. aE, supra note 8, at
285. Professor Shapiro, however, disagrees. See Shapiro, supra note 84, at 946-47.
200 See Posner, supra note 84, at 816.
201 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
202 I. at 129-30.
203 Id. at 125.
204 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969) (rcl)ing on Kent in the
course of recognizinga right to interstate travel), ovemrukd inpart byEdelman %,Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965) (stating that in Kent freedom to
travel abroad was grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Aptheker
v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-506 (1964) (stating that in Kent the Court "declared that
the right to travel abroad is 'an important aspect of the citizen's "liberty" guaranteed in
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment").
205 Kent, 357 U.S. at 129.
206 Id.
207 id- at 128-29.
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tutional question, the avoidance canon requires that the question's
seriousness first be established; and it is predictable that such a show-
ing will result in dicta that will inevitably be influential.
Professor Schauer has been the primary proponent of the view
that the avoidance canon in fact does not avoid the making of consti-
tutional law because it portends a merits-based conclusion.208 Despite
its apparent force, Professor Schauer's argument is ultimately over-
stated. The simple reason is that in the next case-the one in which
the constitutional issue is formally and squarely raised and decided-
the constitutional question is treated as open. Thus, although the
Court might well have signaled its views on the merits in the course of
avoiding the constitutional question in the prior case, it is highly sig-
nificant (especially to litigants) that the question is technically still
open. Moreover, for a variety of reasons the Court might well decide
the question differently when it confronts it squarely.
Professor Schauer's point, however, has an additional dimension.
Even in circumstances where the Court has invoked the avoidance ca-
non, the Court still makes constitutional law by upholding the constitu-
tionality of the statutory construction that it adopts as the result of the
canon.20 9 In other words, by failing to question the constitutional va-
lidity of a statutory construction, the Court implicitly holds that the
construction passes muster. Again, however, the point is overstated.
Such a "holding"-the constitutional validation of the statutory con-
struction that is adopted in favor of the dubious statutory reading-is
not a holding at all. It is instead merely a necessary consequence of
every statutory decision that does not explicitly raise and decide a con-
stitutional issue. In other words, unless the point is actually litigated,
in the next case the parties are free to claim that the statutory con-
struction that the Court earlier adopted (in the course of avoiding a
different serious constitutional question) itself violates the constitu-
tion. The Court has long held that an issue not raised, even if a neces-
sary premise underlying the Court's decision, is not formally decided
until it is actually controverted in the next case.2 10 Thus, although
Professor Schauer's point has practical force, as a formal legal matter
it is not the case that the avoidance canon inevitably results in the
making of constitutional law.
208 See Schauer, supra note 8, at 88-89.
209 See id. at 86-87; cf. Shapiro, supra note 84, at 947 n.134 (wondering whether it
makes sense to view the Court as holding that a statute not actually passed by Congress is
unconstitutional).
210 See, e.g., United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952);
United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805) (Marshall, G.J.).
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C. The Incompleteness of Traditional Critiques of the
Avoidance Canon
As a general matter, traditional critiques of tie avoidance canon
object less to the theory that underlies it and instead question more
whether its practice serves the ends it seeks to achieve. As demon-
strated in Part ll.B, for example, the most common and persuasive
objection to the avoidance canon is that it leads to implausible con-
structions of statutory language, a result that is just as, if not more,
disrespectful to Congress than the mere decision of a constitutional
case. That criticism depends on the implausibility of the statutory
construction that the canon produces, however, and does not account
for the cases in which statutory language is genuinely and fairly sus-
ceptible to multiple interpretations. If the statute is genuinely ambig-
uous, and is also susceptible to more than one reasonable
construction, why not choose the construction that avoids a serious
constitutional question?
Other common criticisms of the avoidance canon are subject to
similar rejoinders in defense of the canon. Consider, first, the argu-
ment that the avoidance canon rests on an overly hypothetical con-
struction of what Congress would have wanted; there is no basis, critics
say, for claiming that Congress would prefer a statutory misconstruc-
tion to a constitutional holding on the correct interpretation of the
language Congress passed.21' Or consider the penumbral argu-
ment-that the canon illegitimately creates a safety zone around diffi-
cult constitutional problems, requiring Congress to be explicit before
it forces a constitutional decision on a question.212 Even granting that
these critiques have substantial force-and I believe that they do-
they are subject to the following rejoinder: once it is established as the
default rule that Congress must be clear to force the Court to decide a
serious constitutional question, there is far less basis for objecting
when the Court refuses to act on a constitutional question in the ab-
sence of legislative clarity. On this account, moreover, allowving Con-
gress to dictate through the terms of its enactments the circumstances
in which constitutional questions will necessarily be answered full), vin-
dicates the norm of legislative supremacy.
213
Critics of the avoidance canon nonetheless have yet a further re-
sponse. First, it is difficult for Congress to achieve pristine legislative
211 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
212 Posner, supra note 84, at 815-16; see FRIEN:DLY, supra note 7, at 210.
213 Of course, Congress cannot create the particular litigation circumstances that will
result in the constitutional question being answered. Sre Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346, 362-63 (1911). But Congress can determine the scope of the questions that u.ill be
answered, and whether those answers will be given on constitutional or statutory grounds,
by the degree of clarity that it provides in the text enacted into law.
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clarity on any given problem; statutes are virtually always over- and
underinclusive in relation to their animating purposes. The more
precision that the judicial process demands from the legislative pro-
cess, the more difficult it is for Congress to achieve its substantive pol-
icy goals through legislation. In other words, the avoidance canon's
demand that the legislative process adhere to judicial interpretive
preferences (even as a default rule) makes it more difficult to legislate
and thus imposes on the legislative process. Moreover, the avoidance
canon's insistence that Congress clearly demonstrate its desire to
force a constitutional decision places the onus on Congress to foresee
the nature of the interpretive problems that will arise under a particu-
lar statute; it is clear, however, that the legislative process cannot ade-
quately anticipate every potential issue (constitutional or otherwise)
that might arise. 214 Thus the argument that the canon is un-
problematic because of its status as a mere default rule takes an over-
simplified and unrealistic view of the legislative process. At the very
least, it takes as a premise a judicial role that appropriately instructs
Congress as to the latter's institutional obligations if it wishes to have
constitutional questions decided by the courts.
Even if the traditional critiques of the avoidance canon falter in
the face of the default position argument, the avoidance canon suffers
from an additional infirmity. In practice, the unpredictability of the
avoidance canon's invocation renders it an arbitrary and manipulable
interpretive norm. The Court sometimes turns somersaults to con-
strue a statute against its apparent meaning to avoid deciding a consti-
tutional question,2 15 yet on other occasions it will deny either that a
statute is ambiguous or that the statutory construction adopted raises
a "serious" constitutional question.2 16 As Professor Eskridge has
noted, "for every case... which interprets statutes to avoid constitu-
tional doubts, there are other cases where a statute is construed
boldly, to face substantial constitutional troubles."2 17 The objection,
then, is not necessarily to the establishment of a default rule, but to an
overly manipulable and unstable interpretive regime that leaves it un-
predictable as to when the Court will decide a case on constitutional
grounds or will instead strain to find a statutory meaning that avoids
the constitutional question.
2 18
214 See POSNER, supra note 8, at 278-84.
215 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440, 466-67 (1989).
216 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991).
217 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutoy Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. Rv.
1007, 1073 (1989).
218 A prime example of this phenomenon is the Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991). I shall have more to say about Rust in Part 111, below, but for now I
just note the following. One of the issues in that case was whether it violated the First
Amendment for the Department of Health and Human Services to issue regulations bar-
ring doctors in federally-funded family planning clinics from providing their patients with
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The critiques of the avoidance canon are powerful, even when
they are subject to more or less persuasive rejoinders.219 As a rule of
statutory construction that is avowedly based in substantive policy---to
minimize the role of the Court in relation to Congress by reducing
the number of occasions on which the product of the democratic pro-
cess is subject to rejection on judicial review and to better enable the
Court to fulfill its role as Congress's faithfil agent in statutory inter-
pretation-the avoidance canon should stand up to scrutiny as to
whether it in fact serves its goals. This Part attempts to illustrate the
problems that the avoidance canon runs up against even when mea-
sured by the goals that it sets for itself. Part Ill will endeavor to show
that the avoidance canon's defects are much deeper even than that.
M
THE AvoioDANCE CANON AND THE RoLE OF THE EXECUTIVE
I now turn to an argument that adds a new dimension to previous
critiques of the avoidance canon. Previous analyses of the avoidance
canon have failed to consider the role of the Executive in the constitu-
tional structure generally and in constitutional litigation in particular.
In circumstances when the Executive is a participant in the litigation
(which, in one form or another, is most of the time) -20 the avoidance
canon does much more than create the hypothetical tear in the fabric
of the separation of powers-a potential conflict between Court and
Congress-when the Court gives a statute a strained or implausible
reading. Rather, the avoidance canon commonly creates a here-and-
information regarding abortion even if their medical judgment indicated that an abortion
was appropriate. Id. at 192. Although the statute at issue did not compel the agency's
reading-which normally would have called for the avoidance canon to be invoked to
avoid what seemed to be a substantial free speech problem-the ChiefJustice's opinion for
the Court simply denied that the First Amendment claim ims substantial. Id. And it did so
despite the views of one Justice that the regulations raised serious constitutional doubts, id.
at 225 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and the views of two others that the regulations in fact
violated the First Amendment, id& at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is fair to say that it
was less than persuasive for the Court to claim that the doubts raised in that instance w'ere
not at least serious. See Kloppenberg, Free Spcrzh Concemzs supra note 8, at 51-52 (arguing
that the constitutional question posed was a serious one); Thomas I. Merrill,Judidal Defer-
ence to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969, 989 & n.87 (1992) (noting that the Court's
opinion was conclusory on whether the constitutional question was serious).
219 An additional rejoinder, which I have failed to mention thus far, is simply that the
avoidance canon should be retained for reasons of stare decisis. That is, even if I am
correct about the defects of the canon, it should nonetheless be retained for reasons of
stability in the law. In light of the serious and pervasive nature of the canon's defects that I
have identified in this Part, and the further defects I shall identify in Part III, I am unper-
suaded. A full consideration of the stare decisis argument, however, would require elabo-
rating and agreeing upon a theory of stare dedsis-a task that is beyond the scope of this
Article.
220 See supra note 10.
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now conflict between Court and Executive. 22' That conflict results
when the Court insists on giving effect to its view over the Executive's,
even when the Executive has offered the better reading of the law and
when it has independently adjudged that interpretation to be consti-
tutional in the exercise of its Article II powers.
This Part shall analyze the context in which the avoidance ca-
non's intrusion into Article II values is most clear-in cases in which
the Executive has exercised law-elaboration authority delegated from
Congress, which would ordinarily be entitled to judicial deference
pursuant to the rule of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.222 If Congress has left statutory ambiguity, Chevron recog-
nizes that it is the Executive's role authoritatively to give content to
the statute.223 The avoidance canon constrains that power, however,
by limiting it to circumstances that do not raise serious constitutional
doubts. Short of an actual constitutional violation, however, the
avoidance canon's operation in this context simply is to displace the
Executive's judgment as to how to execute the law Congress passed.
Treating the avoidance canon's operation in the Chevron context
as illustrative of its intrusion into Article II, this Part then turns to a
more general consideration of the role of the Executive in public law
litigation. This Part argues that the avoidance canon intrudes upon
the Executive's authority and responsibility to see to the execution of
the laws, including both statutes and the Constitution. In applying
the avoidance canon to executive action, the Court is rejecting the
Executive's explicit legal judgment about the meaning of both the
statute and the Constitution, not because the statute is unconstitu-
tional but because it is not clearly constitutional. Such treatment of a
coordinate branch not only shows a lack of inter-branch comity, it pos-
itively turns Marbury v. Madison224 on its head. The avoidance canon
has these effects despite the fact that neither the Constitution nor the
laws of the United States require its application. Thus does the avoid-
ance canon-which the Court adopted and has adhered to out of a
stated desire to maintain judicial modesty-threaten separation of
powers values.
221 It is important to note that the avoidance canon by its own force does not demand
that the views of the Executive be rejected. It is perfectly possible that the Executive would
invoke the canon to persuade the Court to adopt its preferred construction. See, e.g., Reply
Brief for Petitioner the United States at 1, United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64
(1994) (No. 93-723). As a matter of fact, however, the avoidance canon commonly oper-
ates as a barrier "with respect to purely administrative (or executive) judgment on tie
matters in question" which "erect[s] a decisive barrier to certain discretionary decisions by
the executive." Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Cmn. L. Riv. 315, 335-36
(2000).
222 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
223 See id.
224 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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The Court has never taken note of these effects of the avoidance
canon. As a rule ofjudicial prudence and policy, though, it is difficult
to see how the Court can continue tojustif , the avoidance canon with-
out some attempt to account for the role of the Executive in public
law litigation.
A. The Avoidance Canon, Article II, and Cheuron
The context in which it is easiest to see the avoidance canon's
direct conflict with Article II values is when the Executive-whether
an agency or the President-adopts a statutory construction as part of
the exercise of delegated power from Congress. That familiar context
triggers the rule of Chevron,225 a case that is acknowledged to be the
most significant administrative law case in a generation or more.2 6
Chevron established the now-familiar analytic framework by which a
court reviewing agency action first determines whether Congress has
expressed itself clearly on the question at issue. "If Congress has done
so, the inquiry is at an end; the court 'must give effect to the unam-
biguously expressed intent of Congress."'2 2 7 In circumstances when
"Congress has not specifically addressed the question, a reviewing
court must respect the agency's construction of tie statute so long as
it is permissible."
228
The Court has justified Cleuron on two primary grounds, both of
which are relevant to this argument. First, the Court has said that
deference to agency interpretations of unclear statutes is justified be-
cause filling in the gaps is essentially a matter of policy, and "[tihe
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest
are not judicial ones."2 2 That is to say, in the absence of clear direc-
tion from Congress, the policy choices inherent in determining how
statutory regimes will be implemented are quintessentially executive
in nature.
The Court's second justification for Chevron is closely related to
the first. The Court has grounded deference in situations of ambigu-
ity on congressional delegation. As the Court recently stated,
"[d]eference under Chevron to an agency's construction of a statute
that it administers is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity
225 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
226 See, eg., Pz=R L. STRAUSS Er At-, GELLTHoPN & BIE'S Ao. u.tsrLT'.m Lw 620-21
(9th ed. 1995) (emphasizing the landmark nature of the case); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLum. L REv. 2071, 2075 (1990) (same).
227 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1300 (2000) (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (using
the Chevron analysis); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997) (same).
228 Brown & Vrfliamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1300.
229 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
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constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill
in the statutory gaps."230 If Congress has not spoken clearly about
how it wishes the law to be administered, it falls by default to the Exec-
utive-ordinarily in the form of an administrative agency-to make
the policy choices necessary to giving concrete content to the law. As
Professor Pierce has put it, Chevron says to Congress, if "you decline to
make a policy decision through the legislative process, we will deem
your failure to so act as ceding the power to make that policy to the
President."231 It is perfectly consistent with the Constitution for the
President to exercise that power, because Article II devolves upon him
not only the duty but also the power to execute the laws. That is the
theory, at least, of Chevron.232
The Court has applied Chevron broadly to a variety of statutory
schemes involving a plethora of executive agencies. Indeed, it has
rarely pulled back from its devotion to Chevron, though, as we shall
now see, one such occasion is when the agency's construction raises
serious constitutional doubts.
In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Con-
struction Trades Council233 the Court again faced an NLRB policy that
implicated constitutional values.234 The case involved union distribu-
tion of handbills at a shopping mall urging consumers not to frequent
the mall because one of the mall's contractors paid substandard
wages.2 35 The mall owner filed an unfair labor practice complaint
with the NLRB on the ground that the handbilling violated Section
8(b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act because it urged a boy-
cott of the mall, with which the union had no dispute, rather than the
contractor with which it did.236 The Board ultimately concluded that
the handbilling did violate the labor laws and that under the applica-
ble law the First Amendment did not stand in the way of holding the
230 Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1314; see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S.
638, 649 (1990) (noting that a precondition to obtaining Chevron deference is a delegation
of authority from Congress); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (speaking of "express
delegation").
231 RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. LJ. 2225, 2231
(1997).
232 The Court'sjustification for Chevron, which I have recounted here is closely parallel
to Professor Monaghan's important, pre-Chevron account for why judicial deference to
agency interpretations of law can be justified at all. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and
the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 25-28 (1983). Post-Chevron, an enormous liter-
attire analyzing its correctness and impact has been created. For present purposes, I am
interested in the Court's own account for Chevron, which it is fair to say rests primarily on
delegation and gap-filling being inherently a matter for the Executive. My argument in
this Article takes the Court at its word and assesses the avoidance canon in that context,
233 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
234 See id. at 571-73.
235 Id. at 570.
236 See id. at 570-72.
[Vol. 86:831
AVOD17NG CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
union's leafleting unlavful3 3 The case made its way to the Supreme
Court, with the Solicitor General ultimately urging the Court on be-
half of the Board to uphold the Board's order and arguing that its
construction of the applicable labor laws did not violate the First
Amendment.2-s
The Court agreed that under normal Chevron principles it would
defer to the Board's reasonable construction of the labor laws.23 9 But
it went on to note that "[a ] nother rule of statutory construction ... is
pertinent here'"-namely, the avoidance canon.240 After describing
the avoidance canon and its roots, 241 the Court simply stated that it
believed "that this case calls for the invocation" of the avoidance ca-
non, "for the Board's construction of the statute, as applied in this
case, poses serious questions of the validity of § 8(b) (4) under the
First Amendment."242 Concluding that the statute "is open to a con-
struction that obviates deciding"243 that First Amendment question,
the Court rejected the Board's reading and chose an alternative
construction. 29 4
Two points about the analysis in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. bear
emphasis at this point. First, the Court did not claim that it must an-
swer the statutory question at step one of the Chevron analysis; in other
words, it did not conclude that the statute was unambiguously con-
trary to the Board's view.2 45 And second, the Court did not conclude
that the Board's view actually violated the First Amendment, but only
that the First Amendment questions were substantial.24 6 In fact, the
analysis was quite like that in Catholic Bishop, in which the Court re-
quired evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to cover the situ-
ation at hand rather than the normal Chevron inquiry of determining
whether Congress has foreclosed any agency discretion in the
matter.24
7
The end result, then, is that the Court concluded that the avoid-
ance canon simply trumps Chevron.248 Unfortunately, however, the
opinion in EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. contains no explanation for why
the Court reached that conclusion.249 As Professor Merrill has noted,
237 See id. at 573.
238 See Brief for the NLRB at 1, Edwardj DeBarto!o Corp. (No. 86-1461).
239 Edwardj. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 574.
240 Id. at 575.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 578.
244 Id. at 588.
245 Cf id. at 574.
246 Id. at 575.
247 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).
248 See Merrill, supra note 218, at 1023 & n.206.
249 See EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 574-75.
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moreover, "Chevron itself supplies no rationale for such a holding."2 O
Indeed, on the rationale of Chevron it would fall to the Executive as an
exercise of delegated power to determine how to implement the law
within statutory and constitutional bounds. Nonetheless, the Court
simply first acknowledged that Chevron would ordinarily govern and
then announced that the avoidance canon would instead be the appli-
cable interpretive rule.251
There is an unavoidable tension between the Court's invocation
of the avoidance canon in Edwardj DeBartolo Corp. and Article II val-
ues. The Labor Board, charged by Congress to execute the laws, con-
cluded with the support of the Justice Department that its view of the
scope of the labor laws was consistent with both the governing statutes
and the Constitution.252 The Court, on the other hand, simply disre-
garded that view of how the law should be executed, not because any
statute or the Constitution affirmatively ruled out the Executive's pre-
ferred course, but only because the Court deemed it desirable not to
decide a constitutional question. When the Executive exercises power
pursuant to a delegation, it stands in the shoes of Congress. 25 3 If the
agency speaks unambiguously in implementing a valid delegation, the
Court must assess the agency's action as such. Chevron and Marbury
suggest that the Court can disturb the Executive's explicit determina-
tion in these circumstances only if it conflicts with Congress's clear
directions or the Constitution.254
The defects in the operation of the avoidance canon are particu-
larly clear in the Chevron context, perhaps because the Executive has a
congressional delegation of power behind its statutory interpretation.
The Edwardj. DeBartolo Corp. rule, in other words, pits the Court not
only against the Executive, but also against the congressional alloca-
250 Merrill, supra note 218, at 1023.
251 EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 574-75.
252 Id. at 573.
253 Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 284 U.S. 370, 386 (1932)
(stating that when exercising delegated authority, an agency "speaks as the legislature, and
its pronouncement has the force of a statute").
254 This is not to suggest that Chevron is constitutionally mandated. SeeAntonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE LJ. 511, 514-16 (arguing
that Chevron is not constitutionally based but is instead based upon congressional delega-
tion). Rather, starting from the premise that policymaking is better handled by representa-
tive institutions, the Court reasonably assumes that when Congress leaves gaps, it is for the
agency and not the courts to fill them. Congress of course could provide by law that the
avoidance canon should govern, even in the context of agency gap-filling where Chevron
might otherwise apply. Or it might explicitly provide that the Executive should not have
discretion to fill in the blanks in particular statutes. In other words, Congress remains free
to control the occasions for the exercise of delegated power. See Martin v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 152-57 (1991); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,
494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990). When there is such a delegation, however, the Court must re-
spect the agency's exercise of authority within the boundaries set by statute unless it con-
cludes that such an exercise is unconstitutional.
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tion of law-elaboration authority to the Executive.2 5  nhile the Chev-
ron context is an important illustration of the avoidance canon's
intrusion into Article II, those cases are only a part of the larger uni-
verse of public law litigation involving the Executive in which the
avoidance canon harms the separation of powers.
B. The Role of the Executive in Public Law Litigation
Although historically there were exceptions,2 5 6 the norm in mod-
em federal public law litigation is that the Executive-in theory, the
President himself, a department whose head stands in the President's
shoes, or an administrative agency executing the law pursuant to con-
gressional design-is a party to every constitutional case, and thus to
every case in which the avoidance canon comes into play.25 7 The Su-
preme Court has made clear that, under the Constitution, litigation
on behalf of the United States is at the core of Executive power and
"may be discharged only by persons who are 'Officers of the United
States.'"2 5 8 As part of the executive branch, the Attorney General "is
undoubtedly the officer who has charge of the institution and conduct
of the pleas of the United States, and of the litigation which is neces-
255 Thus fiar I have used the term "Executive" to apply to any law executor, including
independent agencies whose heads Congress has insulated from plenary presidential re-
moval power. Indeed, the NLRB, the agency at issue in both Catholic Bishop and Edwardj.
DeBartolo Corp., is a quintessential independent agency. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1994) (lim-
iting the President's authority to remove members of the Board to specified causes). For
purposes of my argument, the distinction between executive and independent agencies,
while not irrelevant, is not terribly important. Because the President retains some control
over all agencies, Article II values are implicated in the Court's dealings even with agencies
whose heads can be removed by the President only for cause. Even in circumstances in-
volving independent agencies, moreover, the agency is the entity charged by the Constitu-
tion with executing the law, subject to the minimal demands Article II places on ultimate
presidential control. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682-83 (1988). Under no theory
is it part of the Court's role to execute the la s. Thus, although the practical power of the
President of the United States to control the exercise of delegated power is less when an
independent agency rather than an executive agency is at issue, the theoretical objections
to the impact of the avoidance canon on Article II prerogatives remain the same.
256 See, e-g., Raoul Berger, Intervention by PublicAgendes in Private Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 50 YALE UJ. 65, 67 (1940) (describing statutory development of the federal govern-
ment's right to intervene to defend the constitutionality of statutes that are assailed in
private litigation); Edward H. Levi &James Win. Moore, Federal Intervention (pt. 2), 47 YALE
UJ. 898, 901-02 (1938) (same); Note, Federal Intervenlion in Private Adions Imolhing the Public
Interes 65 HI. R: L REv. 319 (1951) (same); see also Note, Executive Discretion and the Con.
gressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE LJ. 970, 971 (1983) (arguing that congressional de-
fense of otherwise undefended statutes appropriately corrects the imbalance in
constitutional authority between the legislative and executive branches).
257 See generally GREGORY C. Sist, LmAxio, WiTH THE Fe.EnmuL Govmx,Lt ,r 1-2
(2000) (describing the central role of the government in public lav litigation).
258 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting U.S. Co.'srr. art. I1,
§ 2).
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sary to establish the rights of the government." 25 9 Congress has recog-
nized these prerogatives of the Executive by requiring that the
Attorney General, on behalf of the United States, be notified when-
ever litigation brings into question the constitutionality of an act of
Congress and permitted to intervene to defend the statute's
constitutionality.2
60
Both as a matter of constitutional structure and statute, then, it is
rare for the Court to face a decision on a constitutional issue involving
a federal statute without the government in some form being in court
as a party.261 Moreover, the Attorney General-a quintessentially ex-
ecutive officer who serves at the pleasure of the President262-is em-
powered, indeed generally obligated, to provide legal representation
to any agency or governmental party to litigation.263 In such litiga-
tion, the client agency itself has both legal and programmatic interests
to vindicate; the Attorney General has similar interests to vindicate;
and the President's administration has general legal policy interests
that can sometimes be central to its political and policy agenda.
2 64
Public law litigation, including virtually any litigation that may lead to
the invocation of the avoidance canon, virtually always implicates the
259 United States v. SanJacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279 (1888); see also Confiscation
Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 458-59 (1868) (noting that "so far as the interests of the
United States are concerned, [all suits] are subject to the direction, and within the control
of, the Attorney-General").
260 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (1994). On occasions when the Attomey General, represent
ing the Executive Branch, decides not to defend a statute's constitutionality, she must give
notice to the Congress, which then has the right to defend the statute. 2 U.S.C. § 288k(b)
(1994).
261 In some instances the government has not intervened to defend a statute whose
constitutionality was being assailed. See Baker v. GTE N. Inc., 110 F.3d 28, 30 (7th Cir.
1997) (reporting that the government was not properly notified); Tonya K. v. Bd. of Educ.,
847 F.2d 1243, 1247 (7th Cir. 1988) (reporting that the attorney general had actual notice
and failed to exercise the government's right to intervene). The latter case involved a
situation in which the answer to the constitutional question was relatively clear, see id. at
1248, and thus the Executive likely did not feel the need to intervene to ensure what ap-
peared to be a foreordained result. The opposite posture-in which no government entity
is willing to defend the constitutionality of a statute-is conceivable, but also very unlikely
to occur in the real world. Even if it did, moreover, the likelihood would be that the
Executive would appear to attack the statute's constitutionality. See Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 659 (1980).
262 See Monison, 487 U.S. at 692 (noting that executive power travels "through the At.
torney General"); Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922) (characterizing the Attor-
ney General as "the hand of the President"); William K. Kelley, The ConstitutionalDilemma of
Litigation Under the Independent Counsel System, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1197, 1217-18 (1999) (not-
ing that the Attorney General serves at the pleasure of the President and that Congress has
not seen fit to alter that understanding).
263 28 U.S.C. §§ 512, 514, 516.
264 See CHnARLs FRIED, ORDER AND LAw 13-21 (1991) (describing the centrality of law
and litigation in the author's attempt, as Solicitor General, to vindicate the Reagan Admin-
istration's policy agenda).
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interests .. the Executive.2 65 Those interests include discretionary
judgments, informed by the Executive's views of sound policy, about
how the law-within the limits set by Congress-will be implemented
and enforced. They also include judgments about how to exercise
delegated power from Congress, including rulemaking and enforce-
ment decisions. With respert to both, the President has a positive
power and duty to "take Cai -, that the Laws be faithfully executed."
2c6
This means that, in determining whether and how to execute the laws,
the Executive must make a determination that its action complies with
(or in Article II terms, "faithfully execute[s]") 2 67 the Constitution.
The conduct of litigation by the Executive-which it carries out
as part of that take care power-is in turn part of the interplay that
makes up the separation of powers. As part of the execution of the
265 I recognize that the constitutional relationship between the President-the consti-
tutional officer charged with executing the law-and the independent agencies is unclear
and controverted. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administra-
tion, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 1, 106-08 (1994); Peter L Strauss, The Place of Agendes in Govern-
ment: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Brand, 84 CoLL.'m. L RE v. 573, 578-79 (1984). The
Court has itself not been clear about whether independent agencies are executing the law
in constitutional terms, see Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935), but
it seems clear that they are, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109, 118-19 (1976) (per curiam). For present purposes, two points are
important. First, as a leading treatise has noted, whether or not agencies are independent
(in the sense that their heads are removable by the President only for cause), the President
.cannot [be] prohibit[ed] from having a substantial role in agency polic)making" I Kz.-
xrrH Cure DAvis & RicHARAJ. PiencE,JR., An~mN-vr,iv Lw TRE%TmE, § 2.5. at 50 (3d
ed. 1994). Second, whatever the proper role of Congress in limiting the President's power
to dictate how agencies will execute the law, there is no basis for inferring from the consti-
tutional structure that it is the role of courts to control execution in the hands of indepen-
dent agencies. As perhaps the leading functionalist separation of powers scholar has
recognized, both as a matter of politics and law that whether "the President is to be a
decider or a mere overseer, or something between, [Article 11] requires that he have signif-
icant, ongoing relationships with all agencies responsible for law-administration." Strauss,
supra, at 648.
266 U.S. CoNsr. art. 11, § 3; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Thre
Prident s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE UJ. 541, 570-99 (1994) (arguing that Article H1
grants the President an affirmative power to execute the laws passed by Congress); Cala-
bresi & Rhodes, supra note 9, at 1158-59 (making an analogy between the Article 11 and the
Article I vesting clauses); Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Exerution of the Laws
40 VAD. I Rxv. 389, 391 (1987) (sketching an outline of the President's take care power);
Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presideny, 93 Co~u,. L RE'. 1, 10-11 (1993)
(arguing that the President only has a general power to protect the United States from
harm); Cass R. Sunstein, Wzat's Standing After Lujan ? Of Citizn Suits, "Injuries," and Article
X, 91 MicH. L Rzv. 163, 212 (1992) (noting that "[t]he Take Care Clause confers a power
insofar as it grants to the President, and no one else, the authority to oversee the execution
of federal law"); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator The
Framers and the Presidents Administrative Powers, 102 YAUX LJ. 991, 991-94 (1993) (arguing in
favor of a strong interpretation of the President's take care powers).
267 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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law, the Executive must decide whether to litigate268 and what legal
positions the Administration will advance. Those decision often carry
significant implications for the balance of powers between not only it
and the Court, but also with Congress. The last three presidential ad-
ministrations have engaged in important public law litigation that has
drawn considerable criticism and defensive responses from both
Court and Congress. For example, consider the Reagan Administra-
tion's 1984 decision not to defend the constitutionality of certain pro-
visions of the Competition in Contracting Act, which it claimed
violated Article II by vesting executive power in the Comptroller Gen-
eral, an official removable by Congress.2 69 Putting aside the merits of
the dispute for present purposes, 270 what bears noting is the response
in Congress and in the courts to the Executive's litigation position.
Members of Congress held hearings to express their displeasure; the
Justice Department then retreated from forcing a political confronta-
tion by ordering the statute to be enforced pending resolution of liti-
gation; and Congress then responded in kind, passing legislation to
correct the constitutional defect identified by the President.271 In the
courts, the Ninth Circuit expressed outrage at the audacity of the Ex-
ecutive's presuming to interpret and apply the Constitution in the
course of executing the law,2 72 and the issue escaped ultimate review
by the Supreme Court once Congress amended the law.
273
For other examples, consider the Reagan and Bush Administra-
tions' pursuit of their goal of seeing Roe v. Wade274 first curtailed, and
then overruled, which was widely criticized both within and without
the Court.275 Consider also the Justice Department's decision early in
268 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-65 (1996) (noting that while the
Court has the power to review exercises of prosecutorial discretion for unconstitutional
motives, the power is narrow); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (same).
269 Michael Stokes Paulsen has written a description of these events. See Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Guo.
L.J. 217, 268 (1994).
270 It is worth noting, though, that the Supreme Court later vindicated the Administra-
tion's legal position, holding that any vesting of executive power in the Comptroller Gen-
eral was unconstitutional because that officer was removable by a Joint Resolution in
Congress. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986).
271 Paulsen, supra note 269, at 328-30.
272 See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1122-26 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn
on other grounds, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
273 See United States Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Ameron, Inc., 488 U.S. 918 (1988) (dis-
missing certiorari for this reason).
274 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
275 For an engrossing account of the Reagan administration's efforts, see FRID, supra
note 264, at 71-88; for an unsympathetic account of the same events, see LINCoLN G1PLAN,
THE TENTH JusTiCE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RuLE OF LAW 135-54 (1987). For
Justice Blackmun's dim view of the Executive's efforts, see Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537-38 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (No. 31-746) (suggesting that Solicitor General Rex Lee's
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the Clinton Administration to "essentially side[ ] with a... convict" in
a child pornography case, in a reversal of positions taken by the Bush
Administration as well as the Department officials who were in author-
ity during the gap between President Clinton's inauguration and the
installation of his political appointees in the Department.27 6 After
members of Congress expressed dismay, President Clinton ordered
the Attorney General to modify the Department's views and seek cor-
rective legislation if necessary.27 7 And the SenateJudiciary Committee
later held hearings to examine the Justice Department's conduct in
that case and others. 278
There are numerous similar examples throughout our history.
Congress has expressed its displeasure with agency enforcement deci-
sions in a variety of areas, including as to the Executive's handling of
tax and environmental issues, and has specifically instructed the Jus-
tice Department as to the scope of its lawful litigating authority on a
number of occasions.2 79 In the 1980s, for example, Congress re-
sponded to inklings that the Federal Communications Commission
might intensify efforts to roll back certain licensing preferences for
minorities and women-including by asserting in litigation that such
preferences are unconstitutional2-O8-by passing a law barring the ex-
penditure of funds for that purpose or even for reexamining the
agency's prior policies.281 Finally, history is replete with high stakes
confrontations between the Court and the Executive.282
amicus brief on behalf of the United States advocated that the Court overturn Reet. zade).
For the Court's response to the efforts of the Bush administration, see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (plurality opinion); id. at 942 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276 Joan Biskupic, Administration Redefines Child Pornography Case, AVWsH. POsT, Nov. 2,
1993, at A4. The case in question was Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1993).
277 See Michael Isikoff & Ruth Marcus, Clinton Enters Child Pornography Dispute, WAs".
Posr, Nov. 12, 1993, at Al.
278 See id.; Solicitor General Oversight; Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiiay.
104th Cong. 3 (1995) (statement of Sen. Thompson).
279 See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle that Never Was: Congres.% the BUte House,
and Agency Litigation Authoriy, LAw & CoThMP. PRoBs., Winter & Spring 1998, at 205, 211-
12.
280 See Minority-Owned Broadcast Stations: Hearing on HI. 5373 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm, ConsumerProL, and Fin. of the House Comm. onEnergy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 1-3
(1986) (statement of Rep. Collins) (expressing objections to an FCC brief in a case before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit arguing that the preferences were
unconstitutional).
281 See Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-31 (1987) (appropriating finds to the FCC,
but prohibiting the use of any funds to repeal or reexamine "the policies of the Federal
Communications Commission ... to expand minority and women omnership of broadcast-
ing licenses").
282 SeeJoel K. Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of Law.: Some Prdiminar Explorations,




The debate over the role of the Office of the Solicitor General in
the Department of Justice reflects the separation-of-powers implica-
tions of litigation involving the Executive. A large body of literature
analyzes the proper role of the Solicitor General in developing the
legal positions of the executive branch, with scholars expressing disa-
greement over the extent to which the Solicitor General is obliged to
do the administration's litigation policy-bidding or to assist the Su-
preme Court in a dispassionate manner free from the political biases
of whatever presidential administration happens to be in power.
Some have claimed that the Solicitor General's role is to serve the
interests of the Court, as a sort of super-advisor on the correct answer
to legal questions;28 3 others stress that the Solicitor General's job is to
advocate (within reasonable limits) the legal positions of the executive
branch in the Supreme Court.
284
283 See, e.g., FRANcis BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AuToRiy 97 (1962) (stating that the Solicitor
General is "responsible neither to the man who appointed him nor to his immediate supe-
rior"); CAPLAN, supra note 275, at 3 (arguing that the Solicitor General's role is to serve
dispassionately as the "Tenth Justice"); Rex E. Lee, Lauryeringfor the Government: Polities,
Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIo ST. LJ. 595, 597 (1986) (describing how the Solicitor General
benefits the Court); Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor General and His Client, 59 WNAsti. U,
L.Q. 337, 34546 (1981) (suggesting agencies are a primary place for "preserving te credi.
bility of the Solicitor General's Office in the Supreme Court"); Burt Neuborne, In Luhe-
warm Defense of Charles Fried, 21 Loy. LA L. REv. 1069, 1071 (1988) (arguing that "the
Solicitor General's traditional role as the Supreme Court's friend is infinitely preferable to
its.., role as point man for the executive branch"); David M. Rosenzweig, Confession of
Error in the Supreme Court by the Solicitor Genera4 82 GEO. LJ. 2079, 2081-82 (1994) (noting
that the Solicitor General's position before the Supreme Court would be undermined if
that special relationship were exploited to serve the President); Eric Schnapper, Bechet at
the Bar-The Conflicting Obligations of the Solicitor General, 21 Loy. LA L. REv. 1187, 1195
(1988) (arguing that the Solicitor General must husband his or her credibility with the
Justices); Joshua I. Schwartz, Two Perspectives on the Solicitor General's Independence, 21 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 1119, 1122 (1988) (arguing that the "limited independence of the Solicitor
General [from the executive] branch serves an invaluable function for the judicial
branch"); David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, L .w &
Cormep. PROBS., Winter & Spring 1998, at 165, 170-71 (1998) (arguing that the Solicitor
General best serves the President by fulfilling his institutional role as officer of the Su-
preme Court).
284 See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 264, at 14 (arguing that the Solicitor General's role is to
serve the Administration as an effective advocate, which requires a measure of deference to
the Court); Erwin N. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General-Representing the Interests of
the United States Before the Supreme Court, 34 Mo. L. Rxv. 527, 536 (1969) (describing the
Solicitor General's role as essentially one of advocacy rather than statesmanship); Michael
W. McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General, 21 Loy. LA. L. Rzv. 1105,
1117-18 (1988) (arguing that it is more helpful to see the Solicitor General as an executive
officer than as a "Tenth Justice"); John 0. McGinnis, Pa'nciple Versus Politics: The Solicitor
General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theoy, 44 STAN. L. Rzv. 799, 802 (1992)
(book review) (describing the Solicitor General's "duty to an individual-the President-
who has a constitutional responsibility to interpret the law independently from the Supreme
Court");James L. Cooper, Note, The Solicitor General and the Evolution ofActivism, 65 IND. L.
675, 695 (1990) ("The tension in the Solicitor General's Office between the President and
the Supreme Court is increasingly being resolved in favor of the President."); Janene M.
Marasciullo, Essay, Removability and the Rule ofLaw: The Independence of the Solicitor General, 57
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Regardless of one's view about the proper role of the Solicitor
General, there is widespread agreement on the following proposition.
As a staff member in the Solicitor General's office once said, the inter-
actions between the Court and Department of Justice are among the
"few occasions when one branch of government speaks directly to the
other," and on such occasions the Executive as litigant is required to
act with integrity to the law and respect for the Court in order to be
"faith[ful to] the separation of powers." 28 5 In other words, constitu-
tional litigation has implications for the separation of powers, as inter-
actions between the branches always do, and thus the Executive is
bound to treat the Court with the respect due a co-equal branch of
government. There is no reason why a corresponding obligation on
the Court's part does not exist.
And the Court has recognized this obligation. Perhaps the best
example is its recent controversial decision in Clinton v. Jones.28- 6 In
that case, the Court held that a sitting President is subject to civil suit
in his private capacity, but emphasized the judiciary's obligation to
accommodate the interests of the Executive in the course of such liti-
gation.28 7 The Court recognized that "high respect" for the Presi-
dency "should inform the conduct of" legal proceedings involving the
Executive. 28 Thus the Court has often remarked upon the need for
GEo. WAsI L REv. 750, 752 (1989) ("It is... imperative that the Solicitor General act in
accordance with the President, and that the President exercise some control over him.");
Note, The Solicitor General and Intergovernmental Conflid, 76 MICH. L REv. 324, 364 (1977)
("Ultimately, [the Solicitor General] serves the President."); see also Drew S. Days III, In
Search of the Solicitor General' Clients: A Drama with Many Charact7s 83 Kv. LJ. 485, 503
(1994-95) (noting that "it is important for the Solicitor General to keep in mind his re-
sponsibility to be a forceful and effective advocate for the government while ensuring that
he maintains a reputation for 'absolute candor and fair dealing' in the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts"); Richard G. NWrlkins, An Officer and an Advocate: The Ro!e of the Solicitor
Genera, 21 Loy. LA L REV. 1167, 1169 (1988) (arguing that the proper role of the Solici-
tor General lies somewhere between that of advocate for the administration and indepen-
dent officer of the Court); George F. Fraley, I1, Note, Is therFox lMatthingtheHenhousem: The
Administration's Control of MbG Litigation Through the Solicitor General, 9 AD uN. UJ. Am:. U.
1215, 1230-33 (1996) (recognizing the Solicitor General's dual responsibility as govern-
ment advocate and officer of the Court).
285 CAPLAN, supra note 275, at 211-12.
286 520 U.S. 681 (1997). Among the many critics of that case isJudge Richard Posner,
who has called it evidence of the Supreme Court's lack of connection wivth the real world.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE IN ,E, S TON, L .tPEcH.,nt, ANO TtATRu.
OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 225-30 (2000).
287 Clinton, 520 U.S. at 708-09. Some, particularly Michael Paulsen, consider the inde-
pendent role of the Executive to be so significant that the President, for example, is not
bound to comply with constitutional judgments of the court wvith vwhich he disagrees. See
ag., Paulsen, supra note 269, at 221-22. My argument here does not relate to that point.
Instead, I maintain that while respect for law and for tie courts' constitutional role re-
quires the Executive to comply with a duly issuedjudgment against it, the correlative duty
of the courts is to consider respectfully the legal arguments made by the Executive before
them.
288 Clinton, 520 U.S. at 707.
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deference and respect for the Executive,28 9 even when it was otherwise
in the course of rejecting the President's legal arguments. 290
Thus, the complex interplay of forces that make up the separa-
tion of powers includes the interactions in court between judges and
the Executive. Ordinarily, the merits of the constitutional disputes that
bring the Executive into court provide the tension points in the rela-
tionship. The President might be concerned in litigation about the
merits of whether the legislative veto is constitutional,291 or whether
some version of the line item veto is;292 but there is ordinarily little
controversy over whether the Court's treatment of the Executive in
the course of litigation itself implicates the separation of powers. The
Constitution does not contain, in other words, any structural principle
identifying the specific manner in which the Judiciary and Executive
must interact in court; in the present context, at least, it contains no
lines marking the boundaries of permissible and impermissible con-
duct. 293 The fact remains, however, that litigation calls for mutual
comity and respect.
C. The Avoidance Canon, Article II, and the Separation of
Powers
When one considers the role of the Executive, the tensions be-
tween the avoidance canon and the separation of powers become
clear. The canon disregards the Executive's considered judgment-
both in Chevron and non-Chevron contexts-in the discharge of the
power and duty to see to the execution of the laws, as to how the laws
Congress enacted will be implemented. It does so with respect to dis-
289 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 633 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring); United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). The Court has often noted the
need to defer to the Executive's judgment in the field of foreign affairs, see, e.g., Regan v.
Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (deference to an executive decision in foreign policy);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981) (deference to legislative and executive judg-
ments in military matters), and it has noted more broadly the "unique constitutional" role
of the President, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992); Chicago & S. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (deference to an executive
decision in foreign policy); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-
20 (1936) (deference to the President in foreign policy); see also United States v. Ann-
strong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (noting the need to defer to the prosecutorial discretion
of the Executive).
290 See, e.g., Clinton, 520 U.S. at 708-09; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 715; Youngstown, 343 U.S. at
633.
291 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 922-23 (1983).
292 See Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 420-21 (1998).
293 Cf Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-59 (holding the legislative veto unconstitutional on the
ground that Congress can legislate only through the process of bicameralism and present-
ment prescribed in U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 7); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986)




cretionary judgments as to how the law will be enforced if Congress
has left room for discretion. And it does so with respect to exercises
of delegated power from Congress to give content to open-ended stat-
utory mandates. The avoidance canon therefore not only shows a lack
of comity toward the Executive; it also intrudes into the heart of the
President's Article II authority to execute the law.
1. The Avoidance Canon and Comity
In deploying the avoidance canon, the Court adopts-by de-
sign-a statutory interpretation that might not be the best or most
natural reading in order to avoid the necessity of deciding a serious
constitutional question. In the cases with which we are concerned
here, moreover, in invoking the canon, the Court rejects the statutory
interpretation offered by the Executive.2 4 Although there is ordina-
rily no disrespect implied by simply rejecting a party's legal position,
in the avoidance canon context the grounds on which the Executive's
position is rejected are by no means ordinary. Rather than saying that
the Executive is wrong, the avoidance canon says that a court will not
give effect to the Executive's reading only because it perhaps comes
close to the constitutional line. Indeed, the canon requires that a
court reject the Executive's reading prior even to considering whether
it is a permissible or even the correct reading of the statute. The ca-
non, then, ignores the fact that the Executive has an independent and
constitutionally mandated role in the discernment and articulation of
constitutional meaning in connection with its execution of the laws.-9
294 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
295 Over the past decade or so, the avoidance canon-whether invoked by tie Court
or by ajustice in a separate opinion-has often, though not uniformly, operated to reject
the Executive's preferred course for how the law will be executed. &e Reno v. Am.Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,501 (1999) (SouterJ., dissenting); Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 249 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steel Co. V. Citi-
zens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 119 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting the
position supported by the EPA); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 875 (1996)
(plurality opinion); Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 437-38 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting the arguments of the United States %-here the
named respondent was a federal employee); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
216 n.2 (1995) (reporting that the Solicitor General defended the constitutionality of the
congressional statute at issue); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 340 (1993) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 130, 13839 (1991); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 562 n.4 (1989) (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (United States as amicus curiae); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864
(1989); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989) (ruling against petitioner postal work-
ers in their official capacity, represented by the Solicitor General); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 682 (1988) (ruling against the position supported by United States as amicus
curiae); EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988) (ruling against the position supported by Solicitor General as ami-
cus curiae); see also Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (rejecting a
state's interpretation of a federal statute); RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 412
(1992) (White, J., concurring) (rejecting the state's interpretation of a state statute).
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The Court's Marbury power includes the power authoritatively to re-
ject the Executive's judgments (and Congress's as well) when the
Court concludes that they conflict with higher law.296 But it is difficult
to maintain that the Court is free to disregard those judgments with-
out first determining that the Executive has either misread the statute
or acted unconstitutionally.
As I discussed in Part 11,297 others have commented upon the ag-
grandizement worked by the avoidance canon's refusal to permit Con-
gress to approach the constitutional line.298 As Judge Posner put it,
the avoidance canon creates a sort of penumbra around the real lines
drawn by the Constitution, into which the Court refuses to permit
Congress to venture.299 This affront is greater with respect to the Ex-
ecutive than it is to Congress. When a plausible (but less natural)
interpretation would avoid serious constitutional questions, it is likely
but not unmistakably clear that the Court, in applying the avoidance
canon, has disturbed legislative preferences.300 With respect to the
Executive, however, there is no ambiguity. No doubt is possible when
the Executive makes the determination that a particular interpreta-
tion of the statute is not only desirable, but (in the Executive's judg-
ment) constitutional. Hence, when the Court invokes the avoidance
canon, it creates a here-and-now conflict with the Executive over the
meaning of federal law. And the Court insists on adopting an inter-
pretation of the meaning of federal law-regardless of what the best
interpretation might be-that not only conflicts with the Executive's
reading but also is, by hypothesis, not the only permissible construc-
In other cases, however, the Executive has been able to employ the canon in support
of its own reading of the law. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 32 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 658 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 182 (1996) (SouterJ., dissenting) (United States as amicus curiae); Concrete Pipe
& Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 628-29
(1993) (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. as amicus curiae); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (Solicitor General arguing on behalf of United States For-
est Service); Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 126 (1991) (SEC as amicus curiae); Chap-
man v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464 (1991); United States v. Montsanto, 491 U.S, 600,
611 (1989); Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440, 465-67 (1989); Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 406 n.28 (1989).
296 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803); cf. Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 540 (Jackson,J., concurring) (famously observing that "[w]e are not final because
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final"). Justice Jackson's insight
reflects the fact that the Court's power as final expositor of constitutional meaning de-
pends upon the necessity of its acting in the course of deciding a case. Congress and the
President necessarily have the power to expound upon the Constitution in the course of
discharging their respective duties.
297 See supra Part II.B.1.
298 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 8, at 285; Mashaw, supra note 171, at 840.
299 POSNER, supra note 8, at 285.
300 See supra text accompanying notes 105-40.
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tion.3°1 In short, the Court displays a serious lack of comity when it
rejects the Executive's proffered construction of the law without say-
ing that it is contrary to law-either to the laws of the United States or
to the Constitution itself. The avoidance canon, by its terms, rules out
both conclusions, and the Court is left with nothing more than an
assertion of power over the Executive.
2. The Avoidance Canon and the Power to Execute the Laws
The last point suggests that the Court's treatment of the Execu-
tive in deploying the avoidance canon is more than just bad manners.
In fact, whenever the Court denies the Executive its preferred statu-
tory reading on avoidance grounds, the practical effect is for the
Court to dictate how the laws shall be executed, or, more precisely,
how they shall not be. That arrogation by the Court creates the seri-
ous potential of violating Article II by displacing the President as the
executor of the laws.
It is an essential feature of the separation of powers that no
branch be able to control the lawful exercise of authority by the
others. Thus, for example, it is impermissible for either the Executive
or Congress to revise the judgment of an Article III court, 0"2 because
any such revisions undermine the independent authority of the courts
granted by Article III to decide cases and controversies. Similarly,
Congress's authority to pass legislation limiting the President's author-
ity to remove those who aid in the execution of the laws is limited,W3
and there is an absolute bar on Congress (and, by implication, the
Court) having any role in the removal of executive officers except
301 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998) (noting that the
avoidance canon only comes into play after a conclusion that the statute can be fiirly read
more than one way).
302 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding unconstitu-
tional a federal statute that directed the reopening of final judgments issued by Article III
courts); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)
(refusing to construe a statute authorizingjudicial review of an administrative board's deci-
sions to allow for presidential review of the court's judgment); United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1871) (holding unconstitutional a statutory amendment dictating
the result in a pending case and undermining the President's pardon power); Hayburn's
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411-12 (1792) (holding that the executive may not revisejudicial
decisions).
303 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694-97 (1988) (holding that the President's
authority to remove inferior officers can be limited by statute provided that the limitations
do not too greatly impede his ability to see to the execution of the laws, and stating in dicta
that the removal authority for some officers cannot be limited); Humphrey's E.x'r %. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935) (holding that the President's authority to remove those
who aid in the execution of the law can be limited by statute in some circumstances);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding that the President's authority to
remove principal officers cannot be limited by statute).
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through the constitutionally-prescribed route of impeachment.30 4
The Court has explained that these formal structural principles are
required-particularly those relating to inter-branch control over re-
moval-so that each branch can carry out its constitutional role with-
out interference, beyond that allowed by the Constitution itself, from
the others.30 5 In Bowsher v. Synar,30 6 the Court insisted that allowing
Congress to have any role (other than through impeachment) in the
removal of an officer "would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress
control over the execution of the laws."307 The same notion underlies
the decision in INS v. Chadha-08 holding unconstitutional the legisla-
tive veto, which would have effectively permitted Congress to dictate
after the fact how the law was executed.30 9
The Court has made precisely the same point with respect to the
judiciary. For example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildfe,310 it held that
Congress could not create general "citizen suit" provisions permitting
anyone to sue the Executive for violating federal law, because to do so
would "transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's
most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."' 31' That would expand the Court's proper consti-
tutional role, from that of adjudicating cases or controversies, to "'as-
sum[ing] a position of authority over the governmental acts of
another and co-equal department,' and [thus] becom[ing] 'virtually
304 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (holding unconstitutional a statute
that vested some executive functions in the Comptroller General of the United States, an
officer removable by Congress); cf. Wash. Metro. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abate-
ment of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991) (holding unconstitutional a federal law
allowing members of Congress to appoint the members of, and serve on, a regional airport
board).
305 See, e.g., Barenblattv. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (noting that the sepa-
ration of powers does not permit Congress to "supplant the Executive in what exclusively
belongs to the Executive"). I should note here that my argument does not depend upon
any notion of a strongly unitarian (or non-unitarian) Executive, a debate that has long
raged in the commentary. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Execu,
tive During the First Half-Century, 47 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 1451, 1453-56 (1997) (describing
the academic debate and gathering sources). For just a tiny sample of the academic de-
bate, see Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 266, at 550; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 9, at
1165-68; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 265, at 4; Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous
Branch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725, 1731 (1996); A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New
Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1346, 1347 (1994); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an
Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHi. L. REv. 123, 124 (1994). My argument is not that
Congress cannot greatly influence how the law will be executed through the passage of
legislation, nor is it that the Court cannot affect how the laws are executed by deciding
cases in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States. It is, rather, that
the avoidance canon is ajudicial rule of policy, and is not required by law.
306 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
307 Id. at 726.
308 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
309 See id. at 956-59.
310 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
3"1 Id. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
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continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive ac-
tion.'"312 The following extended quotation captures the point that
the judicial power does not extend to dictating how the laws are
executed:
'When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies
to carry on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is
circumscribed by the authority granted. This permits the courts to
participate in law enforcement entrusted to administrative bodies
only to the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual rights
against administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers....
This is very far from assuming that the courts are charged more
than administrators or legislators with the protection of the rights of
the people. Congress and the Executive supervise the acts of ad-
ministrative agents.
313
Thus, the Court has recognized the structural principle that the
judiciary, like Congress, may not control how the President executes
the law.3 14 How, then, does the avoidance canon pose the danger of
interfering with that principle? In this Part, I will describe the impact
of the avoidance canon on the Executive's ability to execute the laws
by pointing to several real world examples. It bears noting, however,
that what follows are just examples of how the avoidance canon puts
the Court in the position of effectively dictating how the law will be
executed; in fact, these problems arise in virtually every instance in
312 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923).
and Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15
(1972))).
313 Id. (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944) (footnote omitted)).
314 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). I should note here that I will soon
discuss important limitations on this principle, primarily with regard to the power of Con-
gress to pass legislation requiring the President to conform his or her official conduct to
legal standards. Within the bounds of the law, however, Congress cannot control discre-
tionary decisions as to how the law will be executed. Professor Sunstein has powerfully
criticized the standing decision in Lujan, arguing that it denigrates the power of Congress
to dictate by statute how the laws will be enforced (including through judicial decision).
SeeSunstein, supra note 266, at 164-97. Though he also argues that Article II is irrelevant to
the question of injury under the law of standing, see id. at 211-15, he does not deny that the
Take Care Clause devolves upon the President both the power and duty to see to the
execution of the laws, see id.; see also Gene I Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Pailic
Law Litigation, 42 DuKE UJ. 1141, 1163-65 (1993) (criticizing Lujan for rel)ing on Article 11
in disregarding congressional desires in conferring standing); RichardJ. Pierce, Jr.. Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as aJudidaiy Inposed Limit on Legislatite Power 42 DVIM
UJ. 1170, 1186-88, 1200 (1993) (criticizing standing analysis in Lujan in part on the
ground that it transfers power from Congress to Executive). In the avoidance canon con-
text-in contrast to the situation in Lujan, in which Congress had passed a law granting
citizen standing that the Court found to violate Article 1-no law empowers the Court as
part of the exercise of itsjudicial powers to disregard the considered decision of the Execu-
tive as to how the law will be executed. For commentary generally defending the Court's
approach in Lujan, seeJohn G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Linits on Statutory Standing, 42 DuKE
UJ. 1219, 1231-32 (1993).
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which an executive agency is told that the avoidance canon rules out
its preferred course of conduct in executing the law. 315
At the outset it is important to emphasize that there are two re-
spects in which the avoidance canon infringes upon the Executive's
authority and responsibility to execute the laws. First, without a prior
judgment that the Executive's preferred course is unconstitutional, it
rejects the Executive's own judgment about the interpretation of the
statute that best serves its purposes. That interferes with the Execu-
tive's responsibility to take care that the statute be faithfully executed.
Second, as a matter of constitutional duty, when the Executive decides
on its preferred course of statutory implementation, it must make an
independent determination of the constitutionality of that interpreta-
tion. It must exercise its own Marbury powers.316 By refusing to con-
sider the legitimacy of the Executive's constitutional judgment in
cases of doubt, the Court is denying the Executive its authority and
responsibility to take care that the Constitution be faithfully executed.
Consider again the situations in both Kent v. Dule 17 and NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop.318 I discussed both cases extensively above,319 but
now look at them from the perspective of Article II. In Kent, recall
that the Secretary of State had issued a regulation requiring as a con-
dition for obtaining a passport that one certify that one was not, and
had not been, a member of the Communist Party.320 The Secretary
acted pursuant to a 1952 Act of Congress that generally required32'
passports for international travel, but only upon the issuance of a pres-
idential proclamation that the national interest so required. 322 Al-
though Congress had from time to time regulated passports, the
Court has recognized a general understanding "that the issuance of a
passport" is largely within the "discretion of the Executive and that the
Executive [will] exercise this power in the interests of the national
315 As I have noted, my argument here is exactly contrary to existing doctrine. See
EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988).
316 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Pridential Review, 40 CASE IV. lros. L. Rmv. 905, 905-06
(1990).
317 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
318 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
319 See supra text accompanying notes 105-25.
320 Kent, 357 U.S. at 118-19 (describing the passport regulations extant at the time).
321 The Court has exhibited some confusion as to when the requirement of a passport
first became a matter of statutory law. In Kent, the Court stated that, with "minor excep-
tions," the first general requirement was enacted in the 1952 act. Id. at 121. In Haig t.
Agee, however, the Court stated that the requirement was first made general in the mid-
nineteenth century. 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981). For present purposes, it does not matter
when the requirement became law, only that Congress in enacting the 1952 requirement
did not insist that the Executive not come close to the constitutional line in executing its
mandate.
322 Kent, 357 U.S. at 121-22.
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security and foreign policy of the United States."32 Although there is
perhaps some question about the scope of congressional power to regu-
late the issuance of passports,3 24 there is no suggestion that it is up to
the Court to do so.
In Catholic Bishop, the National Labor Relations Board had inter-
preted the general language protecting the right to organize2 as cov-
ering religious employers,3 26 and the Court rejected that conclusion
on avoidance grounds; the Court said that although Congress
"[a]dmittedly . . . defined the Board's jurisdiction in very broad
terms," it would nonetheless look for an affirmative intent to delegate
to the Board the specific authority that it had attempted to exercise
there.3 27 Absent language or history affirmatively providing that the
Board could cover religious employers, the Court interpreted the la-
bor laws as not giving that authority.
In both Kent and Catholic Bishop, the result was that the Court
effectively imposed extra-legal limits on the power of those who exe-
cute the law to do so within lawful bounds.328 It is worth quoting the
language of the statutory grant of authority to the Executive at issue in
Kent. The statute provided that upon a proclamation by the President
that the national interest required these measures, and "until other-
wise ordered by the President or the Congress,"
it shall, except as othenise provided by the President, and subject
to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize
and prescribe, be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to
depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the
United States unless he bears a wlid passporL3-
Although the language of the statute unmistakably conferred broad
discretion-something that was not surprising in light of a long tradi-
tion of executive autonomy in the issuance of passports "derived from
the generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and
323 Haig; 453 U.S. at 293.
324 See Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Pass-
ports, 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 18 (1992) (noting Article II limits placed on Congres's
power to regulate passport issuance).
325 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
326 See Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 216 N.LR.B. 249, 250 (1975) (explaining the
NLRB's position that its jurisdiction did not reach religious institutions "only when they
are completely religious, not just religiously associated"); Catholic Bishop, 220 N.LR.B.
359, 359 (1975) (same).
327 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979).
328 Although the National Labor Relations Board is an independent agency whose
members may only be removed for good cause, there is no doubt that the vwork of the
Board is execution of the laws in the constitutional sense.




responsibility of the Executive" 330-the Court held that the statute
must be read implicitly to limit the Executive's discretion to deny pass-
ports to those who refused to renounce the Communist Party.331 The
problem the Court saw, of course, was that the statute authorizing the
regulation would raise serious constitutional problems if the Court
construed it to authorize a regulation that so greatly affected the right
to travel.33 2 In light of the importance of that right, the Court said it
would not lightly infer that Congress delegated authority to limit it.3
On the contrary, the Court stated, "Congress has made no such provi-
sion in explicit terms; and absent one, the Secretary may not employ
that standard to restrict the citizens' right of free movement."
33 4
Similarly, the language granting power to the Labor Board to rec-
ognize bargaining units did not in any way imply a limit on its reach
when religious schools were at issue.33 5 Yet the Court stepped in there
as well, concluding that unspecified problems under the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment counseled against reading the statute
as broadly as it was written.33 6 And the Court therefore prevented the
Board from executing the law as it saw fit.
As I discussed in Part II, it is by no means clear that the Court was
correct in its imagining of congressional desires in the context of
these cases.337 What is clear, however, is that the language of the rele-
vant statutes did not purport to limit the law administrator's authority
to situations in which the constitutionality of his or her conduct was
not in doubt. Indeed, the passport statute in Kent went so far as to
make its effective date (and expiration date) depend upon the Presi-
dent's judgment.338 Although there is no way to tell, there is at least
as much reason to suppose that Congress meant for an extraordinarily
broad delegation of power as to suppose that it did not. The Court in
Kent, however, simply decided that the impingement on personal lib-
erty from the regulation was so great-though it explicitly disclaimed
actual reliance on constitutional grounds33 9-that it would construe
the statute as a matter of sound policy to limit the scope of the Execu-
tive's authority because otherwise it would have to decide a constitu-
tional case. The same was true in Catholic Bishop. And the Court made
that judgment not only in the face of the Executive's position that its
330 Haig, 453 U.S. at 293-94; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (speaking of the President's foreign policy responsibility).
331 Kent, 357 U.S. at 129-30.
332 Id. at 130.
333 Id. at 129.
334 Id. at 130.
335 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979).
336 Id. at 507.
337 See supra text accompanying notes 12940.
338 See Kent, 357 U.S. at 122 n.4 (quoting from the statute).
339 Id. at 129 (noting that "we do not reach the question of constitutionality"),
888 [Vol. 86:831
AVOIDING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
preferred course was consistent with the law, but also that it ias con-
sistent with the Constitution.
Viewed from the perspective of Article I, the result in these cases
was that the Court stepped in and effectively insisted that a federal
statute be executed in a way that was contrary to the policy wishes of
the law administrator charged by Congress with executing the la%%
Congress had passed no law that limited the discretion of the Secre-
tary of State, on behalf of the President, to implement the passport
rules as he saw fit. Congress had passed no law limiting the power of
the NLRB to cover religious employers. And neither the Court nor
any other government actor had deemed the passport rules, or the
Board's coverage rules, to violate the Constitution of the United
States. To be sure, the Court inplied that the rules did, but it did not
hold as much in the course of deciding a case or controversy.
The Court's disregard of the Executive's judgment as to how the
law will be enforced without declaring the Executive's course unlawful
or unconstitutional is in deep tension with the President's take care
power. The Constitution imposes an affirmative duty on the President
to see that the laws are executed. Unless Congress has dictated
through law what course that execution shall take, with that duty
comes the power to determine how the law will be enforced. If the
law, whether a statute or the Constitution, rules the Executive's judg-
ment out of bounds, then it is no usurpation for the Court to say so in
a proper case or controversy. That is the law declaration function rec-
ognized since Marbury.3 40 But the Marbwy power ends at the point
where the law ceases to provide an answer. In the avoidance canon
context, because no law dictates the Court's interpretive choice, and
by hypothesis the Court has not reached any constitutional question,
the Court's purported exercise of its law declaration function in fact
becomes an exercise of the executive power.
The Court's disregard of the Executive's view of the law also does
not adequately deal with the fact that the responsible government offi-
cials had necessarily, by virtue of their constitutional oath,a41 reached
a judgment that the course they had chosen in executing the law was
both authorized by statute and consistent with the Constitution.M2 As
others have recognized, the Court is not the exclusive interpreter of
340 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stating that "[it is
emphatically the province and duty of thejudicial department to say what the law is").
341 See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
342 SeeLawson & Moore, supra note 9, at 1287; ef. David A. Strauss, Pesidentiallnterpreta-
lion of the Constitution, 15 CARwozo L REv. 113, 121-22 (1993) (criticizing the argument
that the oath entitles the President to autonomy in interpreting the Constitution as ques-
tion-begging).
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law and the Constitution.S43 Indeed, recent years have witnessed a
widespread recognition of the important role nonjudicial interpreta-
tion of the Constitution plays, and a heated debate about the scope of
that power vis-A-vis the power of the Court.3 44 Some have argued for a
very broad conception of Executive review, 345 while others have urged
that the Court's role as final expositor of the Constitution demands
that the Executive defer to its constitutional readings.3 46 That debate,
however, is not at issue here. One can readily agree that once the
Court has issued a constitutional judgment the Executive is bound by
it, not only in the specific case but also generally, yet still object that
the avoidance canon does not involve that situation. On the contrary,
its very design is to avoid a constitutional judgment altogether. In any
avoidance situation, the Executive is in court with the responsible ac-
tors, having concluded pursuant to their constitutional oath that their
preferred course is lawful. Of course, in a contested case or contro-
versy it is emphatically up to the court "to say what the law is."'3 4
7
Again, however, it is not a discharge of that law declaration function
to say that the law is not what the Executive offers for reasons only of
343 See Easterbrook, supra note 316, at 905-06; Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Com-
petent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. LJ. 347, 349-50 (1994);John Harri-
son, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 371, 372-73 (1988); Lawson & Moore, supra note 9, at 1268; Paulsen, supra
note 269, at 219.
344 See Gary Apfel, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The Authority of theJudiciary's Itrpr-
tation of the Constitution, 46 RUTGERs L. Rnv. 771, 773-75 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi,
Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 269, 272-76 (1993); Easterbrook, supra note 316, at
905-06; Eisgruber, supra note 343, at 348; Lawson & Moore, supra note 9, at 1268; Sanford
Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes
Paulsen and Onefor His Critics, 83 GEO. LJ. 373, 373-74 (1994); Christopher N. May, Presi-
dential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Rcyal Prerogative, 21 HAS-rINGS CONS,.
L.Q. 865, 868-69 (1994); John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney
Genera" A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 Ckozo L. Riv. 375, 377-78
(1993); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judg.
ments, 15 CGRDozo L. REv. 43, 44-45 (1993); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Presidents Power of
Interpretation: Implications of a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, LAIV & CoNTrrMP. PROtS.,
Autumn 1993, at 35, 42-43 (1993); Robert F. Nagel, Name-Calling and the Clear Error Rule, 88
Nw. U. L. REv. 193, 211 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Di-
lemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 Coiwozo L. Rv. 81, 84 (1993);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors Levin-
son and Eisgruber, 83 GEo. L.J. 385, 385 (1994); MichaelJ. Perry, What Is "the Constitution"?
(and OtherFundamental Questions), in CONsnTrrtONAus~m: PmLosOPrtcAL FOUNDATIONS 99,
119-24 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998); Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority
and the Rule of Law: Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15
CARioozo L. REv. 137, 141-42 (1993); see generally Strauss, supra note 342 (discussing execu-
tive branch interpretation of the Constitution); Symposium, Elected Branch Influences in Con-
stitutional Decisionmaking LAW & CorNEmp. PRODS., Autumn 1993, at 1 (1993) (same).
345 See, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 9, at 1270; Paulsen, supra note 269, at 223.
346 See, e.g., Burt Neubome, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpret-
ing the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. RFv. 375, 376-77 (1988).
347 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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judicial policy ungrounded in either the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
D. Avoidance and the Nondelegation Doctrine
To the extent that commentators have focused on the avoidance
canon's impact on the Executive at all, they have largely noted that
the canon serves as a sort of nondelegation doctrine. As Professor
Sunstein has recognized, the impact of the avoidance canon is to limit
the scope of policymaking authority that Congress delegates to law
administrators.3 48 The principle underlying the avoidance canon,
Professor Sunstein says, is that serious constitutional questions in law
administration "will not be permitted to arise unless the constitution-
ally designated lawmaker has deliberately and expressly chosen to
raise them."349 Other commentators have made similar points.3 7, In
particular, Professor Sunstein has offered the view that the avoidance
canon (and other canons as well) reflectjudicial enforcement of "un-
derenforced constitutional norms" such as the nondelegation doc-
trine.3 5 1 Precisely because the Court lacks the ability directly to
enforce the nondelegation doctrine, the argument goes, the avoid-
ance canon legitimately serves the structure of the Constitution by
limiting the scope of delegations indirectly; if Congress wants to force
a constitutional issue, it must be clear about that desire.3 -
As others have recognized, in the absence of countervailing fac-
tors, it makes sense for the Court to conduct its business so as to rein-
force the fundamental constitutional structure, even if only
348 See Sunstein, supra note 159, at 468-69; Sunstein, supra note 226, at 2111-13; ser aLso
CAss K SuNSTFJN, ONE CASE AT A T, %I 27 (1999) (talking about the canon as promoting
judicial minimalism).
349 See Sunstein, supra note 221, at 331.
350 See; eg., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 86, at 606-07.
351 See Sunstein, supra note 159, at 469-71. The nondelegation doctrine holds that the
constitutional requirement that the legislature provide an intelligible principle to channel
executive discretion limits Congress's power to delegate polic)making authority to the Ex-
ecutive. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). Only twice has the Supreme
Court struck down delegations as excessive. See A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. -. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935); Panama Ref Co. v. Rpm, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
The Court has continued to maintain, however, that the constitutional rule against exces-
sive delegation exists, see Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646
(1980), though it acknowledges that it is largely beyond judicial enforcement, see Mistrevta,
488 U.S. at 371-74; id. at 415-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
352 See Sunstein, supra note 226, at 2111-13 (arguing that the avoidance canon serves
underenforced nondelegation norms by forcing Congress to deliberate and be specific
about delegating of power that might raise constitutional doubts); cf. Lawrence Gene
Sager, Fair Measur" The Legal Status of Underenforcwd Constitutional Nornn. 91 HRuw: L RE%.
1212, 1213-20 (1978) (arguing that many constitutional norms go underenforced due to
institutional concerns rather than conceptual limits).
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indirectly.3 53 Moreover, there is much force to this description of the
avoidance canon's effects. The case for why it is desirable, however,
has been less clearly made and seems less clearly persuasive. The posi-
tive account rests largely on the proposition that the popularly elected
Congress ought to make the fundamental policy choices in society,
and especially those that raise serious constitutional doubts.3 5 4 Profes-
sor Sunstein argues that the avoidance canon (like other canons he
terms "nondelegation canons") promotes 'judicial minimalism" be-
cause it forces decision making on important policy questions away
from the court to the most appropriate and accountable decision
makers.35 5 As he puts it, such canons reflect a judicial "effort... to
trigger democratic (in the sense of legislative) processes and to ensure
the forms of deliberation, and bargaining, that are likely to occur in
the proper arenas. ' 356 He also recognizes, however, the practical ef-
fect of such canons on the Executive as discretion-limiting.
357
For the reasons I offered in Part II, it seems as though the actual
democracy-enhancing effects of the avoidance canon are not as great
as Professor Sunstein's argument supposes. As scholars from Judges
Friendly and Posner to Professors Schauer and Mashaw have noted,-458
it is far from clear that the avoidance canon in fact operates in a way
that is deferential to the legislative branch, a defect that leaves the
"canon in grave need of either refurbishing or rejection."35 9 What is
more, as Professor Pierce has recognized, the true effect of the avoid-
ance canon is not necessarily to shift power from the Executive to
Congress, but instead is to "confer[] on politically unaccountable
judges the power to make fundamental policy decisions. '360 Even if
the nondelegation justification for the avoidance canon limits the
scope of delegations to the Executive, it does so at the cost of lodging
more power in the courts. Indeed, in avoidance cases where the
Court rejects the more natural reading of a statute, as well as the Exec-
utive's permissible interpretation of that statute, the Court arguably
displaces the judgments of both representative branches without ever
determining that those judgments are unconstitutional. In light of
the uncertain democracy-enhancing effects of the canon and its de-
353 This has been an important theme in the work of Professor Manning. SeeJohn F.
Manning, Constitutional Structure andJudicial Deference to Agency Interpretations ofAgency Rules,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 617-19 (1996);John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Dor-
trine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 675 (1997).
354 See Sunstein, supra note 221, at 331-33.
355 Id. at 335-37.
356 Id. at 335.
357 Id. at 335-36.
358 See FRIENDLY, supra note 7, at 210-12; POSNER, supra note 8, at 284-85; Mashaw, supra
note 171, at 840; Schauer, supra note 8, at 88.
359 Mashaw, supra note 171, at 840.
360 Pierce, supra note 231, at 2231 n.29.
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monstrable imposition on Article 1I values, the best answer is that the
nondelegation benefits, to the extent that the canon realizes them at
all, are not worth pursuing.
Of course, properly deployed, the avoidance canon in its original
form might operate on the margins to serve nondelegation values.
There is a difference between deploying the avoidance canon to pre-
vent the Executive from exercising otherwise concededly lawful dele-
gations of power in a way that raises serious constitutional doubts, and
deploying it in fact to avert a holding that a delegation of power is
unconstitutionally excessive.
As for the former situation, consider the decision in Rust v. Sulli-
van.3 61 In that controversial case, the Court upheld the Bush Admin-
istration's rule barring federal grant recipients under Title X of the
Public Health Service Act of 1970362 from providing information or
referrals relating to abortion as part of their family planning ser-
vices.3 63 The Secretary of Health and Human Services had promul-
gated that rule pursuant to Section 1008 of the Act,36" which
prohibited the use of federal funds in programs that used abortion as
a method of family planning. Private parties claimed that the rule iws
inconsistent with the governing statute, and that it also iolated ie
Constitution.36 5 Most of the focus in the Supreme Court was on the
resolution of the constitutional claims, which the Court rejected at the
urging of the Solicitor General on behalf of the Secretary. GG
361 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
362 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (1994).
363 Rust, 500 U.S. at 203. The rules were codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.2, 59.8-.10 (1989).
Id. at 179. Fulfilling a campaign promise, President Clinton ordered the repeal of the so-
called "gag rule" on the second day of his administration. Ann Devroy. Clinton Cancels
Abortion Restrictions of Reagan-Bush Era, WASH. PosT, Jan. 23, 1993, at Al. For the text of
President Clinton's order, see Memorandum on the Title X 'Gag Rule," 1 WILLLxJ. Cu.,ro.,
PUBC PAPERS OF rME PRESIDENT 10 (1993).
364 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1994).
365 The constitutional argument rested on three grounds: first, the plaintiffs claimed
that the rule violated the First Amendment's Speech Clause by regulating on the basis of
viewpoint the information that a health care provider could impart to her patient; second,
they claimed that the rule impermissibly conditioned the receipt of a government benefit
on the forfeiture of a constitutional right; and finally they claimed that the rule burdened
the constitutional right to abortion. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194-200.
366 Id. at 192-203. The Court also rejected the claims that the rule impermissibly con-
ditioned the right to a benefit upon the forfeiture of a constitutional right and that it
violated the right to abortion. Id. at 196-203. I am not concerned here vdth the correct-
ness of these holdings, which are subject to fair criticism. Sce, eg., Paula Berg, Toward a
First Amendment Theor , of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to Reeie, Unbiasedliedical Ad-
vice, 74 B.U. L. Rm. 201, 206 (1994); David Cole, Beoond Unconstitutional Conditions: Chart-
ing Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L RE-. 675, 682 (1992);
Michael Fitzpatrick, Note, Rust Corrodes: Thw First Amendment Implications of Rust v. Sullivan,
45 STAN. L REv. 185, 188 (1992); Moira T. Roberts, Note, Indiidual Rights and Goernment
Power in Collision: A Look at Rust v. Sullivan Through the Lens of Power Anatyshi 49 W1 SH. &
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Prior to deciding the constitutional questions, however, the Court
first had to answer the antecedent statutory question whether the Pub-
lic Health Service Act authorized the Secretary's rule in the first place.
Based on the avoidance canon, the dissents by Justice Blackmun and
Justice O'Connor urged a construction of the Act that did not author-
ize the rule.3 67 Justice Blackmun argued that construing the statute to
restrict clinics from providing information on abortion as a method of
family planning unnecessarily raised the issue of the statute's constitu-
tionality under the First and Fifth Amendments.3 68 Justice O'Connor,
agreeing with Justice Blackmun's adherence to the avoidance ca-
non,3 69 stopped short of holding the regulations unconstitutional,
and instead believed the Court should have determined that they were
unreasonable interpretations of the statute.370
If one views the avoidance problem in Rust as a nondelegation
issue, the bluntness of the instrument is apparent. The Title X
scheme's delegation of rulemaking authority to the Secretary did not
remotely violate the nondelegation doctrine. Nor was there any dan-
ger that the delegation would allow the Secretary to make important
policy decisions without scrutiny. The highly public and controversial
nature of the rules-and the new President's repeal of them as one of
his first official acts-signifies that the law executor was fully and dem-
ocratically accountable.
If the avoidance canon's nondelegation function is viewed simply
as erecting a barrier to constitutionally dubious agency activity, then it
is fair to say that the canon's invocation there would have served that
purpose (notwithstanding the Court's claims to the contrary,371 the
constitutional objections raised were fairly termed serious). But if that
is the nondelegation function of the avoidance canon, then it is a
blunt instrument indeed. It is both over- and underinclusive as a
nondelegation canon. As discussed above, the avoidance canon is
overinclusive because it permits courts to disturb the Executive's exer-
cise of otherwise legitimately delegated authority simply because the
resulting action might be unconstitutional. At the same time, the
avoidance canon is underinclusive as a nondelegation check because
it leaves undisturbed administrative action that has enormous impact,
both financial and otherwise, on the society at large. Thus there is no
LEE L. REv. 1023, 1024 (1992); Ann Brewster Weeks, Note, The Pregnant Silence: Rust v.
Sullivan, Abortion Rights, and Publicly Funded Speech, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1623, 1625 (1992).
367 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 204-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 223-25 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
368 Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
369 Id. at 224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
370 Id. at 225 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
371 See id. at 191 (holding that the regulations at issue "do not raise 'grave and doubtful
constitutional questions'" (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson
Co., 241 U.S. 394, 408 (1916))).
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logical connection between a nondelegation problem and the simple
raising of a constitutional question. Agency action implicating consti-
tutional problems can pose no threat to nondelegation values at all,
whereas agency action without constitutional implications can have
enormous impact and thus threaten nondelegation values. It is, in the
end, just happenstance that the avoidance canon checks the former
sort of agency action and leaves untouched the latter.
Consider now a different example in which the nondelegation
problem is significant. In American Trucking Associations v. EPA,37 2 the
D.C. Circuit held that the Environmental Protection Agency's inter-
pretation of the scope of its rulemaking authority under certain provi-
sions of the Clean Air Act373 rendered the scope of the statutory
delegation of power to the agency unconstitutional under the
nondelegation doctrine.3 74 The court of appeals held that the statute
on its face provided no intelligible principle to channel the discretion
of the agency as it determined permissible ambient air quality stan-
dards; the statute used only the open-ended standard that the permis-
sible levels were to protect public health with an adequate margin of
safety.3 7 5 Under the agency's reading, the statutory standard would
permit regulation of pollution levels at virtually any amount that the
agency chose; on the record before the court, moreover, there was no
scientifically reliable way to say whether one or another regulatory
standard was better.376 That being so, the court concluded that the
agency's reading of the statute left it unsupervised by Congress in its
rulemaking and thus the statutory authority was unconstitutional
under the nondelegation doctrine.377
Rather than declaring the statute unconstitutional, however, the
court of appeals was willing to consider a reasonable construction of
the Clean Air Act that adequately limited the agency's rulemaking dis-
cretion and thus could possibly be administered in a constitutional
way.378 The court stated that because "an interpretation without the
constitutional weakness is or may be available, our response is not to
strike down the statute but to give the agency an opportunity to ex-
tract a determinate standard on its own." 379 Thus the court remanded
for the agency to seek to implement the statute consistently with
nondelegation principles.
372 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), reversed, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct.
903 (2001).
373 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-09 (1994).
374 American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034.
375 See id. at 1034-35.
376 Id.
377 See id. at 1057.




The Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding (as to the
nondelegation point) that neither the statute at issue nor the agency's
interpretation of it was so open-ended as to leave the agency un-
supervised by Congress in making rules.380 For present purposes, the
significance of the Supreme Court's decision lies in its rejection of the
D.C. Circuit's view that a statute might effect an unconstitutional dele-
gation on one interpretation but not on another. Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court stated that, if the agency's initial interpretation
of the statute violated the nondelegation doctrine, to allow the agency
on remand to choose a different interpretation would also violate the
nondelegation doctrine.381 Upon analysis, however, it is not clear why
that is so. Essentially the Court said that if the statute effected an
unconstitutional delegation, then the proper course was for the court
simply to declare so, and not to remand for the agency to get another
chance to implement the scheme lawfully. That position would surely
be correct if the agency's reading were the only permissible one. On
remand, however, it is possible that the agency reasonably could have
concluded that the statute's text and history admitted of a limiting
construction that would have guided the agency's discretion in
rulemaking so as to solve the nondelegation problem in the prior in-
terpretation. Such a construction might in fact have not been availa-
ble, but if that were so the courts would have had an opportunity to
say so when the case returned from the agency. In cases of statutory
ambiguity, however, there is no logical reason why an agency cannot
unreasonably construe its statutory authority so broadly as to violate
the nondelegation doctrine in the first instance, but later reasonably
arrive at a more narrow construction that comports with the Constitu-
tion. After all, that is precisely the course routinely taken by the
courts in deploying the avoidance canon.
The D.C. Circuit's decision eschewed reliance on the avoidance
canon as a trump over Chevron; instead the court recognized that it
can better serve nondelegation norms-interpreting ambiguous
grants of statutory authority not to allow the agency to approach the
constitutional line-by declaring the agency's interpretation unconsti-
tutional and remanding to see if a constitutional construction is availa-
ble. In that way, the court was able to vindicate constitutional
nondelegation principles, while also giving serious and genuine con-
sideration to the agency's view of how it should execute the law; and
once the court concluded that the agency could not constitutionally
execute the law as it wished, it remanded to the political branch for it
to attempt to execute the law in a constitutional way. The Supreme
380 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903, 913 (2001).
381 Id. at 912; see also Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(Silberman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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Court's disagreement on the merits makes the decision of the court of
appeals of only academic interest. For purposes of my argument, how-
ever, the court of appeals's decision illustrates the properjudicial role
in the avoidance context. Although the court rejected the agency's
view of how it should run the regulatory program, it did so only after
assuring itself that the agency's reading was actually, as opposed to
possibly, unconstitutionala
8 2
In contrast to the situation in Rust, where the constitutional issues
were not remotely related to the nondelegation doctrine, the decision
in American Trucking directly concerns the interplay between avoid-
ance and the structural norm against excessive delegations of power
to law executors. Even in that context, however, the Court could vin-
dicate nondelegation norms without actually striking down an act of
Congress.38 3 Avoidance in that context only would add an unneces-
sary level of confusion. Without the avoidance canon in the picture,
the court's decision path was to consider whether the agency's con-
struction of the statute effected an unconstitutional delegation. If it
did, then the proper course was to remand to the agency for it to
382 Given what appears to be the inconsistency in substance between the Court's deci-
sion in Edwardj. DeBartolo Corp. and Rust v. Sulivan, there is room to question whether the
later-decided Rust decision undermines the proposition that the avoidance canon trumps
Chevron. But the Court in Rust claimed that the constitutional problem there did not raise
doubts that were serious enough to warrant invoking the canon, and said nothing to sug-
gest that EdvardJ. DeBartolo Corp. was no longer good law. Taking the Court at its word, in
his dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in American Trd:ing, judge Silberman
pointed out that the Supreme Court has concluded that "the constitutional avoidance ca-
non trumps Chevron deference." Am. Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 14 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (Silberman,J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
383 This point suggests another reason why the avoidance canon's benefits are not as
great as they first seem. The conventional account is that the primary benefit of the canon
is to avoid putting the Court in the position of striking down an act of Congress. In the
context ofjudicial review of executive implementation of a statute, however, the avoidance
canon will never avert such a holding. Consider the situation in a case like Amerian Thid-
ing, in which the Executive's statutory reading is subject to constitutional judicial review.
Once the court concludes that the agency's reading does not pass constitutional muster, it
does not strike down the statute; instead, it sends the case back to the Executive for it to
determine whether there is another available statutory reading that is constitutional. If
there is no such alternative reading available, then the court will be bound to strike down
the statute when it returns onjudicial review. If the court had instead invoked avoidance
and adopted the alternative construction for itself without remanding, it could have pre-
cluded the constitutional judgment that the agency's readingof the statute was unconstitu-
tional. Even if the court had reached the constitutional question, however, it would not
have struck down the statute itsdf The agency would have remained free to adopt a new
reading on remand. If there is no av-ailable reading of the statute that avoids the constitu-
tional defects, however, then the statute is simply unconstitutional. In that circumstance,
the avoidance canon is irrelevant. Thus, although the avoidance canon perhaps averts a
holding that a particular reading of a statute is unconstitutional, it neter averts a holding
that a statute is unconstitutional altogether. The avoidance canon might therefore reduce
the number of actual constitutional decisions, but it is unnecessary to preserve the separa-
tion of powers from the true inter-branch conflict of the courts telling the legislature that it
has violated the fundamental law.
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attempt to arrive at a constitutional construction; on the other hand,
if the agency's construction was lawful, then the court's proper re-
sponse would have been simply to declare so. The only benefit from
avoidance would have been to overenforce the nondelegation norm,
which is hardly a benefit at all if the canon's only grounding is in a
judicial assessment of good policy and not in the laws passed by Con-
gress or the actual requirements of the Constitution. That situation is
not compellingly attractive, especially in light of the fact that the alter-
native is not to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, but in-
stead to remand for the law executor to have another opportunity to
execute the law in a constitutional manner. If it turns out that there is
no permissible construction of the relevant law, then the avoidance
canon would not (at least legitimately) be able to save a law that is
actually unconstitutional in all its applications.
CONCLUSION
This Article has raised objections-going well beyond serious
doubts-to one of our most venerable canons of construction. On
close analysis, the avoidance canon, which is designed to maintain the
Court's proper place in the constitutional structure, turns out to be
deeply troubling to the separation of powers. With respect to Con-
gress, the avoidance canon in practice often does not serve the value
of legislative supremacy. The canon wrongly assumes that Congress
legislates without ever intending to approach the limits of the Consti-
tution. And it often results in the Court adopting interpretations that
the legislative branch could not have foreseen nor intended.
With respect to the Executive, the avoidance canon in practice
disregards Executive judgments as to how to discharge the power and
duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. That is true for
discretionary judgments as to how, as a matter of policy, gaps in statu-
tory schemes will be filled. And that is even more true for Executive
exercises of delegated power to give content to statutory commands
from Congress.
Neither the Constitution nor federal statute requires the avoid-
ance canon; it is instead a rule of judicial policy designed to achieve
the substantive ends of the separation of powers. Yet the Court has
shown little awareness of the potential impact on congressional pre-
rogatives from statutory misinterpretations in the pursuit of avoid-
ance. And it has shown no awareness that the avoidance canon can
effectively place it in the shoes of the President as the law executor in
our constitutional system. In every application of the canon, the
Court would do well to stop and recognize that understanding the
proper scope of the avoidance canon requires seeing that avoiding
constitutional questions is a three-branch problem.
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